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Abstract
Why is GDP so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? To answer
this question, we propose a theory of technological diversiﬁcation. Production makes
use of diﬀerent input varieties, which are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. As
in endogenous growth models, technological progress increases the number of varieties,
raising average productivity. The new insight is that an expansion in the number of
varieties also lowers the volatility of output. This is because additional varieties pro-
vide diversiﬁcation beneﬁts against variety-speciﬁc shocks. In the model, technological
complexity evolves endogenously in response to proﬁt incentives. Complexity (and
hence output stability) is positively related with the development of the country, the
comparative advantage of the sector, and the sector’s skill and technology intensity.
Using sector-level data for a broad sample of countries, we provide extensive empirical
evidence conﬁrming the cross-country and cross-sectoral predictions of the model.
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ours.1 Introduction
Economies at early stages of the development process are often shaken by abrupt changes
in growth rates. In his inﬂuential paper, Lucas (1988) brings attention to this fact, noting
that “within the advanced countries, growth rates tend to be very stable over long periods
of time,” whereas within poor countries “there are many examples of sudden, large changes
in growth rates, both up and down.” This negative relationship between the volatility of
growth rates and the level of development is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the standard
deviation of annual growth rates against the level of real GDP per capita for a large cross
section of countries.
In an attempt to understand the sources of volatility, Koren and Tenreyro (2004) quantify
the contribution of various factors at diﬀerent stages of development, ﬁnding that the high
volatility in poor countries is due to 1) higher levels of sectoral concentration, 2) higher levels
of sectoral risk (that is, poor countries not only specialize in few sectors, but those sectors
also tend to bear particularly high risk), and 3) higher country-speciﬁc macroeconomic risk.
A volatility accounting exercise carried out by these authors indicates that approximately 50
percent of the diﬀerences in volatility between rich and poor countries can be accounted for
by diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of the economy (higher concentration and sectoral
risk), whereas the other 50 percent is due to country-speciﬁc risk. These characteristics
of the development process, as we later explain, are inconsistent with previous theoretical
explanations of the dynamics of volatility and development. The purpose of this paper is to
provide an alternative theory that is in line with the empirical evidence.
To that end, we develop an endogenous growth model of technological diversiﬁcation.
The key idea of the model is that ﬁrms using a larger variety of inputs can mitigate the
impact of shocks aﬀecting the productivity of individual inputs. This takes place through
two channels. First, with a larger variety of inputs, each individual input matters less in
production, and productivity becomes less volatile by the law of large numbers. Second,
whenever a shock hits a particular input, ﬁrms can adjust the use of the other inputs to
partially oﬀset the shock. This second channel operates even if production exhibits an
extreme form of complementarity (as in Kremer (1993)’s O-ring technology). Both channels
make the productivity of ﬁrms using more sophisticated technologies less volatile.
The idea can be illustrated with an example from agriculture: Growing wheat with only
land and labor as inputs renders the yield vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks (for example,
weather shocks such as a severe drought). In contrast, using land and labor together with ar-
tiﬁcial irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc., makes wheat-growing not only more productive
but also less risky, because farmers have more options to react to external shocks. Figure
2 provides a graphical illustration of this example. It displays the volatility of wheat yield
(calculated as the standard deviation of percentage deviations from the country’s average
1yield) of the 20 biggest wheat producers against their level of GDP per capita.1 Yield volatil-
ity falls sharply with development. This remains true if we control for diﬀerences in climate
across countries, including the volatility of rainfall and temperature (see Table 1).
The shocks aﬀecting individual inputs or individual production techniques may come from
various sources. Another example of such a shock could be a sudden change in the price of a
major input of a production technique. Countries with a diverse set of available techniques
can cope better with the shock. For instance, the types of power plants that countries rely on
to generate electricity vary with development. Small and less-developed countries have only
a few plants very highly concentrated on one particular technique of electricity production
(employing either traditional thermal or hydroelectric plants). Developed countries, on the
other hand, have access to nuclear and renewable-resource plants and are typically more
diversiﬁed. Firms in these countries will react diﬀerently to oil price shocks. Table 2 reports
how the electricity production of countries responds to oil price changes. The electricity
production of less-developed and small countries concentrated on few types of power plants
is signiﬁcantly more sensitive to oil price shocks than that of countries with a diverse set
of plants. More speciﬁcally, while the electricity production of countries concentrated on
a single energy source drops by about 1 percent after a 30 percent oil price hike, there is
no such drop for diversiﬁed countries. Firms in countries with diverse sources of electricity
can mitigate the negative impact of an oil price shock by substituting away from oil. The
share of oil in total energy consumption falls by 0.3 percent after a 30 percent oil price hike,
whereas no substitution takes place in concentrated countries.
We next turn to the questions of what determines technological diversiﬁcation and why
poorer countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. We extend the model to allow for
international mobility of goods and for cross-country diﬀerences in endowments. Much as in
models of endogenous growth and directed technical change, the technological complexity of
a sector in a given country evolves endogenously in response to the incentives of the creators
and users of new technologies. In particular, more input varieties will be directed towards
sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage, making them more complex and
less volatile. The stage of development of the country will also matter, because inventing
and/or using the new inputs is subject to increasing returns to scale. Countries accumulate
new inputs as they develop, which brings about a gradual decline in their volatility. The
speed of development, and hence the speed with which volatility declines, may be inﬂuenced
by the initial level of volatility. If investment risk is harmful for growth, which is the case
for a range of plausible parameter values in our model, then poor and volatile countries will
1Note that agricultural technology varies substantially with development. For example, of the top 20
wheat producers, India uses 2.3 tractors per 1,000 acres of arable land; this number is 128.8 for Germany.
Fertilizer use also varies hugely. India uses 21.9 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers per acre; Germany uses 183.8
tons. We take the level of development as an overall indicator of agricultural sophistication.
2develop slower and will remain highly volatile for long periods.2
The model delivers clear-cut predictions about the relationship among technological di-
versiﬁcation, volatility, and productivity. Using sector-level data for a broad sample of
countries, we provide empirical support for these predictions. First, any given sector is less
volatile in developed countries. This result holds if we control for the quality of institutions
which may facilitate a smoother response to external shocks, such as ﬁnancial development
and the ﬂexibility of the labor market. Second, within a given country, large, skill inten-
sive sectors using complex technologies are less volatile. This is consistent with our model
which says that new inputs/technologies will be directed towards such sectors, thus reduc-
ing volatility. These two mechanisms lead to a decline in aggregate volatility as a country
develops: The economy experiences less volatility in each sector and resources move towards
relatively safer sectors.
The link between volatility and development has been studied before by Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), and Obstfeld (1994),
who describe the technology choice as a portfolio decision: In order to reap the beneﬁts of
high productivity and high growth, an economy has to bear more risk. The risk tolerance
typically relates to the level of development and the ﬁnancial structure of the economy.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)’s model also features increasing returns to scale: Early in
the development process diversiﬁcation opportunities are limited, owing to the scarcity of
capital and the indivisibility of investment projects. This feature can explain the high levels
of sectoral concentration observed in poor countries. However, all these models predict
that at early stages of development countries will tend to specialize in safer (even if less
productive) sectors as a way of seeking insurance. This prediction is not borne out by the
data: Koren and Tenreyro (2004) document that poor countries are highly concentrated
in sectors that bear particularly high volatility. In addition, these authors ﬁnd that most
developing countries are inside the “mean-variance frontier,” being highly prone to specialize
in high-variance, low-mean sectors. These ﬁndings contradict the predictions of the portfolio-
based models and suggest that important constraints must be at play, preventing developing
countries from investing in safer and, at the same time, more productive assets.3
Our model departs from the portfolio view of the world that features a necessary trade-oﬀ
between volatility and performance at the sector level. It can then naturally accommodate
the fact that poor countries tend to exhibit high sectoral concentration and also that the high
concentration falls mainly on high-risk sectors. In addition, unlike in previous contributions,
2See Angeletos and Calvet (2001) and Angeletos (2004) for a discussion of how volatility aﬀects investment.
Note, however, that in these papers there is no explanation for why volatility is higher in the ﬁrst place. See
also Ramey and Ramey (1995) on the empirical evidence.
3Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) document that, for highly
developed countries, industrial specialization tends to increase with development. However, as we later show,
this does not result in higher aggregate volatility because these sectors tend to be technologically diversiﬁed
and are hence more stable than the rest of the economy. The fact that the higher specialization of rich
countries does not increase their aggregate risk has also been shown by Koren and Tenreyro (2004).
3the volatility of individual sectors in our model is endogenous: It depends on the level of
development and the comparative advantage of the country.4
Our paper is related to previous work by Kraay and Ventura (2001). As in their paper,
the open-economy version of our model features the prediction that rich countries have a
comparative advantage in less-volatile sectors. The diﬀerence lies in the way this result is
achieved. In Kraay and Ventura (2001), high-skill sectors, which are prevalent in developed
countries, enjoy less-elastic product demand. Markups can then serve as a buﬀer against
productivity shocks, reducing the volatility of high-skill sectors. For example, a drop in
output of a diﬀerentiated product makes that product more expensive in the world market.
This terms of trade improvement partly oﬀsets the original shock. On the other hand, no
such “terms-of-trade insurance” is taking place for homogenous products that poor countries
specialize in.
There are, however, empirical objections to the mechanism proposed by Kraay and Ven-
tura (2001) and its implications. The model predicts a negative relationship between produc-
tivity shocks and terms-of-trade ﬂuctuations (particularly negative for developed countries).
That is, negative productivity shocks should be associated with an improvement in the terms
of trade. In the data, however, the relationship between ﬂuctuations in labor productivity
and the terms of trade is somewhat positive, and there is no diﬀerence between rich and
poor countries in terms of this relationship.5
Finally, our model builds on a vast literature on endogenous growth models in which
the development of new varieties of goods enhances productivity. (See for example, Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).) The contribution of our paper is to provide a
uniﬁed framework for the explanation of development and volatility. We provide sectoral
evidence for a broad cross-section of countries that conﬁrms the predictions of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we discuss the empirical implications and oﬀer novel evidence in support. We
summarize and conclude in Section 4.
2 A Model of Technological Diversiﬁcation
2.1 Technological diversiﬁcation, productivity, and volatility
In this section, we introduce a production process that features technological diversiﬁcation:
Input varieties contribute not only to higher productivity but also, because inputs are subject
to imperfectly correlated shocks, to lower volatility.
4As Koren and Tenreyro (2004) have shown, diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of developed and
less-developed countries account for about 50 percent of the diﬀerence in volatility.
5It is possible that other factors are at play, blurring the predicted relationship; at this point, nonetheless,
we can say that the extent of countercyclicality in the terms of trade is not the prima facie mechanism behind
the negative relationship between development and volatility.











where Xi is capital services from capital variety i , n denotes the number of working machines
and 1/(1 − σ) ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.6
Machines can fail randomly, in which case they irreversibly cease to contribute to produc-
tion. We assume that failure occurs independently across machines and time periods with
probability γ dt. That is, the lifetime of a machine is exponentially distributed with param-
eter γ. For our argument we need only that failures are imperfectly correlated. We take the
extreme assumption of independence for expositional clarity. The assumption that random
failures turn the machine completely useless makes the model more tractable, since we need
only keep track of the number of working machines. However, technological diversiﬁcation
would still take place with less terminal shocks: Appendix B considers an example where
there is only a partial drop in productivity after a machine failure.
In an open-economy context, changes in the world price of the input or sudden disrup-
tions of trade could also be an important source of input-speciﬁc shocks. Technological
diversiﬁcation can mitigate the impact of such shocks.
Using machines in production involves increasing returns to scale: Machines are indi-
visible. This means that anyone operating a machine has to buy one unit of the machine
beforehand. This minimum scale requirement limits the scope of diversiﬁcation across ma-
chine varieties.7
Since we are interested in the inner workings of a sector and how technology choice aﬀects
volatility, we posit increasing returns at the input level. Indivisibility and minimum scale
requirements are inherent characteristics of many an input used in technologically advanced
sectors. Note that increasing returns are also a feature of the use of the machines, not
only their invention or production. That is, we assume that machines can be produced and
bought in any quantity but only a full unit is productive.
The setup of a machine requires κ units of the ﬁnal good. Once the machine is set up,
the owner gains monopoly power over its services. This monopoly lasts until the machine
(exogenously) becomes obsolete, that is, the lifetime of the “patent” is the same as the
lifetime of the machine and is exponentially distributed with parameter γ.
6As usual in endogenous growth models, we assume that σ>0, that is, machines are gross substitutes.
Appendix B considers an example when this is not the case. Introducing additional (scarce) factors of pro-
duction would not change our qualitative results, it would just make the returns to variety more decreasing.
7Note that there is no incentive to install two or more units of a single machine variety, both because the
production function features a “love of variety” and because machines are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. A
similar assumption is made by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who work with minimum scale requirements
at the industry level.
5We assume that the machine can be used with diﬀerent intensities by employing “oper-
ators.”Machine i can provide twice as much service if operated by twice as many workers.8
Producing a unit of capital service requires one unit of labor (by appropriate deﬁnition of
labor units).
Formally, the services of machine i at time t are:
Xit =
 
lit, if Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
0, otherwise;
(2)
where Ki0 is the amount of capital devoted to machine variety i, lit is the number of operators,
and Ti is the exponentially distributed lifetime of the machine.
Consider the output of a ﬁrm, using n types of machine services, with Xi units of each,
Y = n
1/σXi. (3)
As is apparent from (3), productivity is increasing in the number of varieties holding the
amount of each individual variety ﬁxed. This is the usual “love of variety” eﬀect of many en-
dogenous growth models (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991). The eﬀect is stronger
the lower is σ, that is, the less substitutable machines are. Intuitively, if machines are highly
substitutable, any additional variety is less needed.
As Xi also denotes the number of operators working on machine i, the overall number of
machine operators working at the ﬁrm is L = nXi. Hence (3) can be rewritten as
Y = n
1/σ−1L. (4)
Productivity is also increasing in the number of machines if we hold the total number of
operators (L) constant (since σ<1). The dependence is weaker than in (3), because any
new machine requires operators taken away from old machines.
This implies that we have two alternative deﬁnitions of productivity, one holding the
operators per machine constant, the other holding the total number of operators constant.
We think both measures are useful, since the adjustment across diﬀerent machine varieties
can take place relatively fast within the ﬁrm (in particular, no hiring or ﬁring of workers or
capital installation is needed).9
Given that the number of machines is a random variable (individual machines fail at
random and there is a ﬁnite number of machines), productivity will be random, too. What
8This is a way of capturing endogenous capacity utilization which is recently emphasized in business cycle
studies. Allowing for capacity constraints or decreasing returns to capacity utilization would not alter our
setting qualitatively. First, capacity constraints would not bind in equilibrium. Economic growth takes place
via the expansion of machine varieties while the services of an individual variety shrink. Second, investors
will be interested in the total, not the marginal proﬁt when deciding whether to build a machine. This will
remain positive even with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, if the cost function were isoelastic, the
share of proﬁt in total revenue would be constant, just as in the present formulation.
9The eﬀectiveness of this margin depends on how quickly and how eﬃciently machine operators can
switch between diﬀerent machines. Our assumption that any worker can operate any machine captures the
6happens to output when a machine fails? First, the number of machines becomes n − 1,
making output lower for any given Xi. However, the demand for the services of an individual
machine will also change. Again, it will be important to distinguish between the two measures
of productivity. First, if we hold the number of operators per machine constant, productivity
drops from n1/σ to (n−1)1/σ. However, if we allow operators to be reallocated evenly among
the remaining machines, the drop in output will be smaller, because we have allowed the
ﬁrm to adjust the capacity utilization of the remaining machines in response to the shock.
Productivity drops from n1/σ−1 to (n − 1)1/σ−1, so the proportional drop is smaller.
The variance of productivity changes declines with the number of machines for both pro-
ductivity measures. In the ﬁrst case, this is just an application of the law of large numbers:
Since output is an average (more precisely, a CES aggregate) of imperfectly correlated indi-
vidual machine services, proportional changes in productivity become less and less volatile
as the number of machines increases. The second case displays an additional eﬀect: The
more machine varieties the ﬁrm uses, the better they can respond to shocks by employing
the remaining inputs at diﬀerent intensities. Qualitatively, both eﬀects imply that volatility
declines with “technological complexity” (n). However, important diﬀerences arise when
individual inputs are complements rather than substitutes of each other (such as in the O-
ring production function of Kremer (1993)). Then the law of large numbers does not apply,
because aggregate productivity is no longer an average of individual productivities. Still, as
we demonstrate in Appendix B, volatility will fall with technological complexity if we allow
for the second margin, variable capacity utilization.
To derive the variance of productivity formally, let a denote the log of productivity when
the number of operators per machine (Xi) is held constant.




(Lower-case letters denote logarithms.) On the other hand, if we hold the total number of
operators constant at L,w eh a v e˜ a, the log of productivity, allowing for variable capacity
utilization (VCU).
˜ a = y − l = φlnni,
where we have introduced the notation φ =1 /σ − 1.
Our measures of volatility will be the variance of the changes in these two TFP variables:






VolVCU = Var(dy|n,L) = Var(d˜ a|n)=φ
2 Var(dln n|n).
extreme case when such a switch is immediate and fully eﬃcient. In reality, of course, we would see less
than perfect ﬂexibility. However, as the skills needed to work with advanced technology are very diverse
(for example, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) document that computerization increased the demand for
non-routine cognitive tasks), we believe that such adjustment is important in practice.
7Let us for the moment assume away growth in the number of machines and study what
happens to existing machines over time. (We introduce growth in the next section). The
number of machines, in the absence of investment, changes because machines break at ran-
dom.10 Given that machine lifetimes are exponentially distributed with parameter γ and
lifetimes are independently distributed, the ﬁrst failure comes after an exponentially dis-
tributed time with parameter ntγ.
Tk ∼ exp(γ),
Tmin =m i n
k=1,...,n
{Tk}∼exp(ntγ).
The ﬁrst failure reduces the number of machines by one, so
nt+h =
 
nt if h<T min,
nt − 1 otherwise.
The probability of no machine failure over a period of length h is 1 − e−ntγh. The expected
change in the number of machines is
E(nt+h − nt|nt)=−e
−ntγh,






If we take h → 0, we get the instantaneous mean and variance of the number of machines,
E(dnt|nt)=−γnt dt,
Var(dnt|nt)=γnit dt.
More formally, in the absence of investment, the number of machines follows a continuous-
time, discrete-space Markov process known as a “pure death” process with death rate γnt.
Such a process can be well approximated by an Itˆ o process if nt is large. (See Appendix A.)
That is, for large nt, the changes in the number of machines in a dt period of time will be
approximately normal. This is just a version of the central limit theorem for discrete-space
Markov processes. In the next section we allow for growth in the number of machines. The
economy will then exhibit long-run growth in nt, implying that the approximation will get
better and better over time.
10Investment in new machines also changes the number of machines, but only gradually, because only a
ﬁnite ﬂow of investment will be allocated to new machines at any point in time. That is, investment does
not contribute to the volatility of the number of machines. Formally, investment follows a bounded variation
process. Even if we allowed for “jumps” in the number of new machines (say, investors could borrow a whole
machine abroad), we are interested in the productivity shock before such an investment response takes place.
Note that we are also assuming away integer problems of investment here. See Appendix A for a formal
treatment of the number machines as a discrete-state Markov process.
8Consequently, abstracting from growth, we can express the evolution of nt using the
following stochastic diﬀerential equation,
dnt = −γnt dt +
√
γnt dz,
where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Given this approximation for dnt,
we can use Itˆ o’s lemma to write dlnnt as follows:
dlnnt = −γ(1 + 0.5/nt)dt +
 
γ/nt dz.
What is important here is that the volatility of the log number of machines declines with
the existing number of machines. Even though as nt gets big, the ﬁrst failure gets more and
more likely, the proportional (that is, log) drop in the number of machines it induces is less
and less important. As is standard in statements of the law of large numbers, the second
eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst one. In other words, diversiﬁcation across several machines makes
log productivity less volatile.
Given that nt measures the number of inputs subject to diﬀerent shocks, we take it
as an index of technological complexity. It is clear from (3) and the discussion above that
technological complexity both increases average productivity and reduces the volatility of
productivity. In the next section, we endogenize the investment in new machines, and
consequently, the resulting level of technological complexity.
2.2 Endogenous technological complexity
What determines the level of technological complexity in the long run? In this section we
endogenize the decision to invest in machines. Much as in models of endogenous growth
(Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992), machine owners will
be attracted by greater proﬁt opportunities.
We ﬁrst look at a one-sector economy to bring out the relationship between volatility
and development clearly. In Section 2.3, we introduce multiple sectors and investigate how
the relative complexity of sectors evolve endogenously. As we have documented in Koren
and Tenreyro (2004), intrinsic volatility diﬀerences across sectors together with countries’
diﬀerent patterns of specialization are responsible for an important portion of the diﬀerence
in output volatility between rich and poor countries. As in other multi-sector models of
endogenous technology, we will have directed technical change (Acemoglu 2002, Caselli and
Coleman 2000). Proﬁts per machine variety will depend on the size of the sector (number
of available operators), its relative wage, the degree of competition (number of existing
machines), and trade openness.
Technology will be the same as in (1), which results in the following aggregate production
function for the ﬁnal good (4):
Y = n
φL.
The economic environment is characterized as follows. The ﬁnal good sector is perfectly
competitive, that is, ﬁrms take output and input prices as given. In contrast, machine
9providers act as monopolistic competitors, that is, they are price setters for their own machine
but take the overall price of the composite machine varieties as given.11
There is a continuum of symmetric consumers/investors with unit mass. Each consumer
has access to the well-diversiﬁed mutual fund of all machines. They can trade the share
of this mutual fund freely, instantly, and in any quantity (even shorting is allowed). This
will ensure that the mutual fund is priced by the consumer’s stochastic discount factor.
In other words, we assume no frictions in the domestic ﬁnancial market. Note that there
is no positive supply of a riskless asset in the economy, in other words, every production
technology is risky.12 Each consumer supplies L units of labor inelastically in the labor
market. Consumers decide how much to consume and how much to invest in the mutual
fund of machines, taking the rate of return and wage rate as given.
Time is continuous and consumers maximize lifetime expected utility over consumption









subject to a standard intertemporal budget constraint,
dai =[ ( µP + D/P)ai + wL− Ci]dt + σPai dz.
The change in the asset holding of consumer i,d ai, comes from capital gains (µP)a n d
dividend yield (D/P) on the asset and from labor income (wL) minus consumption (Ci).
As we later show, stock prices follow a diﬀusion process, so asset holdings of consumer i will
also follow a diﬀusion with instantaneous volatility σPai. The mean and variance of the rate
of return on machines generally depends on the state of the economy, that is, the number of
machines.
To derive the equilibrium of the economy, let us ﬁrst consider the pricing decisions of


















j and ﬁnal demand Y as
given, the machine owner faces a constant elasticity demand curve with elasticity 1/(1−σ).
11Note that this is a valid assumption even if there is a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent machine varieties. First,
the market share of each machine owner falls at the rate 1/n, whereas the standard deviation of output is
of order 1/
√
n. That is, even if n is large enough to make monopolistic competition a realistic assumption,
we still have positive aggregate volatility. Second, volatility falls with the number of independent machine
varieties, which may be smaller than the number of machine owners if some of the machines are subject to
common shocks or if there are interactions across machine-operating ﬁrms.
12Alternatively, the rate of return on a riskless asset (for example, storage) is so low that investors do not
demand a positive amount.
10She will hence follow a constant markup rule when pricing its services. The optimal
monopoly price of each capital service will be
χi = w/σ,
where w is the wage rate. Final good prices are, in turn, determined from the price of the
services of an individual machine and the number of machines.
Proﬁt maximization implies that price equals marginal cost in the ﬁnal good sector. We











This implies that wages increase in productivity:
w = n
φ.




Xi = nXi = L.
The markup rule also implies that proﬁts are a constant, (1/σ − 1) = φ, share of wages.
Total wages are wL, hence the wage costs of a single machine operating ﬁrm are wL/n (by
symmetry), implying that proﬁts are
πi = φwL/n. (6)
The owner of a machine uses this proﬁt ﬂow to calculate the lifetime cash-ﬂow of the machine.
Investors take the number of installed capital varieties, the wage rate, capital prices, and the
return on equity as given.
We assume free entry into the machine market. This means that any investor can buy
κ units of ﬁnal good and install a new machine variety. As long as there is positive entry,
this pins down the value of a machine at V = κ.13 We further assume that the sunk cost
required to install a machine is falling with the level of technological progress, n, because of
spillovers or learning-by-doing externalities. In particular, it falls at a rate φ − 1t oe n s u r e
balanced growth. Expanding variety growth models usually make a similar assumption to
ensure long-run growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Chapter 3). Alternatively, one could
set φ = 1 by restricting the elasticity of substitution across varieties to be 2. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 6) put restrictions on the elasticity of substitution across input
varieties. Either assumption delivers balanced growth and qualitatively similar results.
13If V< κ , no new machines are built and the growth rate is zero. We will later verify that this is not an
equilibrium.
11Also, we assume that ﬁxed costs are proportional to the overall size of the economy, L.
This assumption ensures that the growth rate is not dependent on country size. (See Jones
(1995) on the “scale eﬀect” of endogenous growth models.) Recall that κ measures the unit
of a machine variety that is subject to variety speciﬁc shocks. Arguably, bigger countries use
more capital of each variety and therefore require a bigger investment. Our main results are
not sensitive to this assumption. The only result that would change without this assumption














w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dw = nφ and κ = κ0Lnφ−1. The dividend yield is higher the higher the
proﬁt rate and the lower the ﬁxed cost of installing a machine. The assumption of falling
ﬁxed costs ensured that the dividend yield does not vanish as n increases. If the dividend
yield tended to zero as n became large, we would obtain a steady-state distribution of n
instead of an ever-growing economy.
Note that even if the dividend yield on a machine is constant, the rate of return is
random, because there are random capital losses due to machine failures. This results in an
average depreciation rate (and hence capital loss) γ∆t over a period ∆t, but this capital loss
i sr a n d o me v e na sw et a k e∆ t → 0. We next turn to characterizing the stochastic process
driving the value of machines.
Let Pts denote the period-s value of all the machines installed at time t. At the time of
installation, Ptt = ntV . However, after an exponential lifetime the ﬁrst machine fails and
Pts becomes (nt − 1)V . The ﬁrst failure occurs with probability 1 − e−γnh over an interval
h.T a k i n gh → 0, we get the following mean and variance for the change in the value of the
machines
E(dPt)=−γntV dt = −γPt dt,
Var(dPt)=γntV
2 dt = γP
2
t /ndt.
We use the same arguments put forward before for the number of machines and approximate
the value of machines by a diﬀusion process:
dP/P = −γ dt +
 
γ/ndz. (9)
Once we know the rate-of-return process for stocks (which, recall, are the only form of
investment), we can use the Euler equation to determine the optimal consumption/saving
policy.







dt +d ( MP)
 
=0 ,
where M is marginal utility, Mt = e−ρtC
−θ
t , D is the dividend on an asset, and P is its price.
This holds whenever investors can freely trade the asset (as is assumed here).
Because of complete domestic ﬁnancial markets, both marginal utility and the stock price
follow a geometric diﬀusion process driven by the same shock dz. The asset pricing equation
then simpliﬁes to
µM + D/P + µP + σMσP =0 ,
where µM is the proportional drift and σ2
M is the proportional variance of marginal utility
(for example, Cox and Huang (1989)). The expected change in the discounted asset price
(inclusive of dividends) can be zero only if the sum of all drift terms is zero.












dt − θσc dz,
where µc and σ2
c refer to the proportional drift and diﬀusion of C, respectively. Marginal
utility declines with impatience and with the mean consumption growth rate and increases
with consumption volatility (that is, the convexity of marginal utility gives rise to precau-
tionary saving motives). Substituting this formula in the asset pricing equation results in










where r(n) refers to the sum of dividend yield and mean price decrease of stocks.
The mean growth rate of consumption depends positively on the mean rate of return,
with a coeﬃcient equal to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ.A t t h e s a m e
time, because the consumer’s portfolio is risky, its covariance with consumption will make
saving less attractive and will hence result in lower consumption growth. Given that we have
complete markets, in other words, there is only one source of uncertainty in the economy,
the instantaneous correlation between stock prices and consumption is 1, so the covariance
is σcσP. Finally, since future consumption is risky, prudent consumers have precautionary
savings depending on the volatility of consumption and the degree of prudence, (θ +1 ) /2.









13In general, consumption also depends on the state of the economy, n.L e t C = v(n)b e
the policy function that describes the optimal amount of consumption given the number of














































where we have omitted the argument n from v(n) for brevity.
The growth rate of machines, µn, depends on investment, which, in turn, depends on the
consumption policy. By equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market,
Y = n
φL = v(n)+( µn + γ)nκ = v(n)+( µn + γ)n
φκ0L. (12)
Total output has to equal the value of consumption plus investment. Investment is the sum
of net investment (µn) and the replacement of broken machines (γ).
Equations (11) and (12) together with σ2
n = γ/n deﬁne a second-order ordinary dif-
ferential equation for v, which has two linearly independent solutions. We therefore need
two boundary conditions to pin down the optimal policy function, v(n). One is that no
consumption takes place without capital, v(0) = 0. The other one comes from the fact
that as n becomes arbitrarily large, σ2
n becomes zero and the economy resembles a non-
stochastic Ramsey model. Consumption growth in the non-stochastic Ramsey model is






=˜ µc =( r − ρ)/θ.
To obtain an analytical solution, we put restrictions on the CRRA and the elasticity of
substitution across machine varieties and assume that θφ =1 . 14 Whether this is plausible
depends on how broadly we interpret machine varieties. If these are diﬀerent intermedi-
ate inputs necessary to produce a particular good, the inputs may be strong complements,
in which case the elasticity is less than one. This would lead to a negative φ which we
have ruled out (but see Appendix B for an example of such a production function). How-
ever, if we think of machine varieties as representing alternative production techniques that
14For other values of relative risk aversion, numerical techniques can be applied to solve (11). If θ<1/φ,
then the saving rate is increasing in n. Intuitively, low-θ consumers are less prudent, so the precautionary
motive is relatively small. This means that risk aversion dominates and saving declines with volatility. In
this case, poor countries develop slowly because their excess volatility discourages investment. The reverse
is true for θ>1/φ. Similarly to Angeletos (2004), we have the cutoﬀ at an IES less than one (RRA greater
than one) because capital does not exhaust all income as long as φ<1.
14can highly substitute each other, then higher elasticities are more plausible. For example
the elasticity of substitution across goods produced in diﬀerent countries (within a narrow
product category) is estimated to be around 4–7 (Hummels 2001). Estimates based on the
time series of U.S. imports are usually lower, in the range of 1–2 (Gallaway, McDaniel and
Rivera 2003). For an intermediate range of 3–4, the value of φ is 1/2–1/3, resulting in a θ of
2–3. This is plausible both as a measure of relative risk aversion and as an inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).
Proposition 1. If θφ = 1, the optimal policy function, v(n) takes the form v0nφ,w h e r ev0
is given by
v0 =( 1− φ)L + ρκ0L. (13)
Proof. Direct substitution reveals that whenever v0 satisﬁes (13), v0nφ satisﬁes (11). For
this policy function, v  n2/v = φ(φ − 1), v n/v = φ,a n dµn is independent of n.S i n c ev0nφ
also satisﬁes the boundary conditions, it is a unique solution.
Deﬁning the value of all the machines as K = nκ, equation (13) can be rewritten in terms
of aggregate variables as
Y − C = φY − ρK =( φ − ρκ0)Y,
since the capital output ratio in this economy is nκ0Lnφ−1/(nφL)=κ0. Investors save (and
invest) a constant fraction of current output. The saving rate is increasing in the proﬁt rate
(φ) and decreasing in the degree of impatience (ρ) and sunk cost of investment (κ0).
From (12), we can express the growth rate of the number of machines as
µn = φ/κ0 − γ − ρ,
resulting in an output growth rate of
φµn = φ(φ/κ0 − γ − ρ).
This completes the characterization of the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. Countries
with high proﬁt rates and low investment costs will develop faster, implying both a faster
growth of output and a faster fall of volatility. In the next section, we extend the model in
two directions in order to account for the diﬀerences in specialization patterns between rich
and poor countries.
2.3 A two-sector model of technological diversiﬁcation
In this section, we allow for a richer characterization of the economy, by extending the model
to a two-sector economy. The sectors diﬀer in the extent of skill intensity. We introduce a
multi-country setup, allowing for cross-country diﬀerences in endowments and compare the
results for closed and open economies. Allowing for international trade, as we later show,
15can explain the observation that poor countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. In
fact, comparative advantage magniﬁes the diﬀerences in volatility between poor and rich
countries through its eﬀect on the patterns of specialization.
Let us assume that there are two sectors, one producing a capital good Yk, the other



















Both sectors use the same CES technology, but they have access to a diﬀerent set of machines.
In particular, the number of machines in the two sectors will (endogenously) be diﬀerent.
The owner of each machine will decide which sector to operate in. The total number of
machines nk + nc is denoted by n.
We assume that machines in the capital good sector are operated by skilled labor, whereas
those in the consumption good sector are operated by unskilled labor.15 Note that machines
are a metaphor for technology in our model so this amounts to assuming that some tech-
nologies are skilled labor intensive, whereas others are unskilled labor intensive. Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998) show that computerization has increased the demand for skilled labor.
However, previous technological advances such as the industrial revolution and the introduc-
tion of the production line relied more on unskilled rather than skilled workers (James and
Skinner 1985, Goldin and Katz 1998). In this paper, we think of the skilled-labor intensive







hit, if i ≤ nk, Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
lit, if nk <i≤ n, Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
0, otherwise.
(14)
Here hit denotes the number of skilled operators and lit the number of unskilled operators
of variety i,a n dκ and Ti are deﬁned, as previously, as the ﬁxed cost of building a machine
and the random lifetime of machine i.
Let H denote the overall stock of skilled labor in the economy and L the stock of unskilled







15Any positive diﬀerence in skill intensity is suﬃcient for our results; we assume this extreme diﬀerence in
skill intensity for tractability.
16In Section 3 we discuss how we identify technological complexity in the data.
16Similarly to the one-sector case, the productivity of a ﬁrm in sector i will be increasing in






Both sectors are perfectly competitive. Each producer takes the wage rate and the set of
machine varieties available to the sector as given.
What determines the allocation of machines across the two sectors? Again, investors
will maximize proﬁts and move toward sectors with better proﬁt opportunities. The price
of machine service i will be marked up over the skilled wage in the capital good sector and
over the unskilled wage in the unskilled sector:
χi =
 
wH/σ, if i ≤ nk;
wL/σ, if nk <i≤ n,
where wH denotes skilled, wL denotes unskilled wages. This makes proﬁt per machine a
constant φ fraction of wages per machine:
πi =
 
φwHH/nk, if i ≤ nk;
φwLL/nc, if nk <i≤ n.
In long-run equilibrium, the rate of return on machines in the two sectors have to be equal.








with ω = wH/wL denoting the skill premium.
The number of machines in a sector is proportional to the total wage bill of the sector.
Whenever (17) fails to hold, that is, one of the sectors has relatively few machines, that
sector has more proﬁts per machine than the other one. Investors will then move machines
across sectors (if machines are movable), or invest only in the more proﬁtable sector until
the equality is resolved.
We assume that machines are freely and instantly movable across sectors. This assump-
tion ensures that rk = rc at any time in any state of the world, implying that (17) holds at
any point in time.17 Since (17) would always hold in the long run, we only need this assump-
tion to simplify the transitional dynamics: If machines can instantly adjust across sectors
17Formally, the present discount value of a machine is pkκ in both sectors. If the dividend yield in one
sector is higher than in another, an investor could buy one unit of high-dividend stock and short one unit
of low-dividend stock. Since the prices of the two stocks always move in parallel, this strategy presents an
arbitrage opportunity with positive net dividends in all future periods and no price risk. Absence of arbitrage
hence implies the equalization of dividend yields.
17then the economy will immediately jump to its balanced-growth path. Because the machines
are movable across sectors, the single state variable is the total number of machines, n.
Equation (17) describes a version of directed technical change, as in Acemoglu (2002) or
Caselli and Coleman (2000): Machine varieties are directed towards the sector with a higher
share in employment. On the one hand, this is a size eﬀect: if there are many operators
in a sector, it is more proﬁtable to operate machines there and hence more machines will
move towards this sector. On the other hand, there is also a relative price eﬀect: If the skill
premium is high, the relative price of the capital good is high, so proﬁts are higher in the
capital good sector.
Since the ﬁnal good sectors are competitive, the relative price of the capital good will







If there are more machines allocated to the capital sector, it becomes more productive, and
its relative price falls.
2.3.1 The closed economy
In a closed economy, the relative price is determined by the relative supply and demand of






where A is a constant and ε is the elasticity of substitution between capital and consumption



























As we will show, the nominal saving rate in the economy is constant, which means that
pkYk/Yc is constant. This implies that the relative demand for the consumption and the









Since we have assumed 0 <φ<1, the relative number of machines is increasing in the
relative amount of skilled labor in the economy. However, a 1 percent increase in skill
abundance induces a less than 1 percent increase in the relative number of machines in the
capital good sector. This is because the abundant factor (more precisely, the good that
18uses the abundant factor intensively) becomes cheaper and hence less proﬁtable for machine
owners. This relative price eﬀect has been pointed out by Acemoglu (2002).
The ﬁxed cost required to build a machine is assumed to arise in capital goods. In terms
of consumption goods, the ﬁxed cost is pkκ. The mean rate of return on machines is the




− γ = φ
wHH/nk
pkκ






where we have made use of the facts that capital good prices equal marginal costs (wHn
−φ
k )
and that the sunk cost is falling at the rate φ−1, κ = κ0Lnφ−1. Relative to (8), the important
diﬀerence is that the rate of return is falling in the relative complexity of the capital good
sector. The number of machines aﬀects proﬁtability in two ways. First, more machines make
the capital sector more productive and hence more proﬁtable (productivity is proportional
to n
φ
k). Second, competition increases in the number of machines, because machines compete
for a scarce supply of operators (H). This second eﬀect lowers proﬁts proportionally with
n, so it dominates the ﬁrst for φ<1.
The relative demand for capital and consumption goods will be determined by the
consumption-saving decision. Since the mutual fund holds all machines in both sectors,
the Euler equation of the consumer is the same as in (11), but the growth rate of machines
and the return on machines may be diﬀerent.











As before, we conjecture that optimal consumption is given by v0nφ, which, by the equilib-















The Euler equation simpliﬁes to µn = r − ρ. Substituting from (22) and (23), we see that

















Note that v0 does not depend on n, implying that the allocation of machines across sectors
as well as the relative prices are independent of development. In other words, the economy
exhibits balanced growth. This also means that the saving rate is constant as previously
claimed.
192.3.2 A small open economy
Suppose instead that the country is a small open economy freely trading the output of the
two ﬁnal good sectors at an exogenously given world relative price. We assume that the
individual machine varieties cannot be traded. In other words, investors can buy foreign
capital goods and install them in their own country as machines, but the physical machines
installed abroad cannot contribute to production.18 This assumption ensures that countries
cannot circumvent the ﬁxed costs of machine operation by importing machine services from
abroad and hence cannot fully diversify instantly. The number of machines in the country
will hence be a state variable that can only be adjusted gradually. At any given point in time,
the number of available machines and hence overall technological complexity is given. In
the long run, investment in new machines will determine technological complexity, economic
development, and volatility.
Trade is balanced at any point in time, ruling out international borrowing and lending.
This also means that investment is ﬁnite (growth in the number of machines is gradual) in
every instant, because the country has only ﬁnite ﬂow output to oﬀer in exchange for foreign
capital goods. In contrast, if we allow for borrowing, investors can immediately borrow to
replace a broken machine, smoothing out some of the shock to productivity. We assume away
such consumption smoothing behavior because the current accounts of countries (especially
those of less-developed ones) do not seem to act as buﬀers against productivity shocks.19
Let ˜ pk denote the world price of capital. We then have from (18)













Conditional on the levels of productivity in the two sectors, the world relative price of the two
goods completely determines the relative wage. All else equal, a higher relative price of the
capital good (high ˜ pk) leads to a higher relative wage of the factor which is used intensively
in that sector (high ω). This is the FPE part. At the same time, the more productive the
capital good sector is relative to the consumption good sector, the higher the relative wage
of skilled labor.
18If we interpret machine varieties as diﬀerent techniques of production, this amounts to very costly
imitation and no technology spillovers across countries. Comin and Hobijn (2004) document a relatively
slow adoption of leading technologies developed elsewhere. A positive but ﬁnite cost of technology adoption
could be modeled such that machine varieties already in use abroad have a lower installation cost ˜ κ<κ .A
˜ κ>0 would be suﬃcient to deliver qualitatively similar results.
19Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) show that the beta coeﬃcient of consumption response to output shocks of
countries is close to one.
20Note that, as standard in small open-economy models with free trade, the production
structure is independent of demand considerations. Relative demand for the two sectors (in
our case, the consumption/investment decision) will matter only for the patterns of trade.











Notice that, similarly to the closed economy case, (21), the relative number of machines in
the capital sector increases in skill abundance. However, the dependence on skill abundance
is stronger, 1/(1 − φ), because we no longer have an oﬀsetting relative price eﬀect. This is
just the Rybczynski theorem applied to directed technical change.
The impact is also greater than in the case of pure factor price equalization. The reason
for this is that machines ﬂow towards the sector that already has a comparative advantage,
making it relatively more productive. This becomes an additional source of comparative
advantage. In other words, the initial comparative advantage gets magniﬁed by directed
technical change. Our model says that even small human capital diﬀerences can account for
large diﬀerences in specialization patterns and, hence, in the relative volatilities of sectors.
2.4 Extension to multiple sectors
Suppose now that there are S sectors, each using the same CES technology but requiring
diﬀerent levels of skill for machine operation. In particular, sector s requires that each
operator possesses at least hs amount of human capital, and we order sectors such that
hS >h S−1 > ... > h1. The output of machine i in sector s is
Xis =
 
hslit, if Ki0 = κ,a n dt<T i;
0, otherwise,
where lit is the number of workers on machine i who are “qualiﬁed” to operate the machine
in the sense that they have a level of human capital higher than hs.
There are altogether L workers in the economy, and their human capital endowment is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F(h). The number of workers
capable of operating machines in sector s is hence [1 − F(hs)]L. The two-sector case of
Section 2.3 is a special case of this framework, with a fraction of people having high human
capital (skilled workers) and the rest having low human capital (unskilled workers).
Given the number of machines in each sector, (n1,n 2,...,nS), labor market equilibrium
requires that each worker be employed on machines that require the highest skill level that
this worker can supply.20
20To prove this, suppose there exists a worker with human capital level hj ≥ hs+1 (that is, capable of
working in sector s + 1) working in sector s. This worker is not willing to switch to sector s + 1 because
ws+1 <w s. But all workers in sector s+1 are capable of operating sector s machinery, and they would earn
higher wages in that sector. Hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
21This implies that a fraction 1−F(hS) of workers is employed in sector S, and a fraction




where αs is deﬁned as the share of workers in sector s, F(hs+1) − F(hs) (deﬁned for all s
with h0 =0 ,hS = ∞). Proﬁts per machine are a constant, (1 − σ), fraction of revenues per
machine,
πs =( 1− σ)˜ psn
φ−1
s hsαsL,
where ˜ ps is the price of product s determined in world markets. Directed technical change
will equate per-machine proﬁts across sectors, πs = πz, so the relative number of machines









A sector will use relatively more machines if it is producing an expensive good, it is skill
intensive, or has a bigger pool of workers with matching skills. Such sectors are also more
productive and less volatile. In other words, given the overall number of machines, n =
n1 + n2 + ... + nS, technological complexity and productivity are increasing, while volatility
is decreasing in the sector’s skill intensity and its share in total employment.
The variance of sector s in country i is φ2γ/nis, so we can write the log variance as
lnVaris =2l nφ +l nγ − lnnis = νi − [ln ˜ ps +l nhs +l n ( Lis/Li)]/(1 − φ), (30)
where νi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect.
This is a key equation for our empirical exercise. While we can measure a sector’s skill
intensity and its share in employment, we do not observe ˜ ps, the price of the sector’s output
in world markets. Instead, we interpret it broadly as an unobserved sector-speciﬁc variable
that aﬀects the level of complexity, capturing not only variations in the value of output but
also, for example, technological diﬀerences across sectors. Note that this variable is common
across countries within a given sector, so we can control for it using either sector ﬁxed eﬀects
or observing technological complexity in any given country.
3 Productivity, Volatility, and Technological Complexity: The
Empirical Evidence
The model developed in the previous sections leads to a set of predictions concerning the
relationships among productivity, volatility, and technological diversiﬁcation. We discuss
these predictions in light of the empirical evidence.
Prediction 1. GDP volatility declines with development.
22This is one of the stylized facts in the literature and the main motivation of this paper.
There are large cross-country diﬀerences in volatility. The standard deviation of annual GDP
growth during the period 1970 through 2000 ranges from 1.4 percent to 21.8 percent (a factor
of 15) across 167 countries. The most volatile decile of countries had a standard deviation of
GDP growth of 12.9 percent. This is seven times as high as the volatility of the least volatile
decile (1.8 percent). This cross-country variation in volatility is highly correlated with the
cross-country variation in the level of development, gauged by real GDP per capita. More
speciﬁcally, as shown in Table 4, the elasticity of GDP variance with respect to GDP per
capita is −0.326 (with a robust standard error of 0.066).21
In the model, investment in new machines brings about development and a gradual decline
in volatility. Countries that have few machines are both less developed and more volatile.
In the multi-sector version, our model proposes two channels to explain this negative asso-
ciation. First, a within-sector channel, whereby a given sector exhibits higher technological
complexity in more-developed countries. This, in turn, implies that a given sector is both
more productive and less volatile in developed countries. Second, a compositional channel,
whereby poor countries specialize in relatively less complex sectors. This implies that poor
countries concentrate in sectors with (absolute) lower productivity and higher variance. In
what follows, we check the empirical consistency of the predictions associated with these two
channels.
Prediction 2. For any given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies. This
implies that for any sector, a) poor countries are both less productive and more volatile and
b) productivity and volatility are negatively correlated.
• For a given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies.
Various studies have explored the process of technology diﬀusion across countries. For
example, Caselli and Coleman (2000), document that the adoption of computers depends
heavily on the level of development of the country, and, more speciﬁcally, on the level of
human capital. Caselli and Wilson (2004) show that this result extends to a broader set of
high-technology equipment (where the extent of technology embodied in capital equipment
is measured as the R&D content).
Our model implies that these cross-country diﬀerences in technology are also present
within sectors. Since directed technical change equates the rates of return on machines in
all sectors, poor countries will use proportionately fewer machines in all sectors, holding
comparative advantage patterns constant.
The two examples mentioned in the introduction suggest important cross-country tech-
nological diﬀerences for a given sector: Developed countries tend to use more agricultural
machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides in agriculture and have access to more types of power
plants in the energy sector. Recent empirical studies provide additional support for this
21Table 3 presents the list of countries included in the computation.
23observation. For example, Comin and Hobijn (2004) document how speciﬁc technological
innovations have spread across countries. Many of these innovations are relevant only to
certain sectors (for example, mule spindle, blast oxygen furnace, internal combustion engine,
aviation). The authors show that most innovations originated in developed countries and
spread gradually to less-developed countries. This implies that in any given year, in all
relevant sectors, poor countries use less sophisticated production techniques than rich ones.
• For a given sector, poor countries are both less productive and more volatile.
In the context of our model, the previous ﬁnding, in turn, implies that a given sector
is both less productive and more volatile in poor countries. We test this prediction using
sectoral data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2002).
The UNIDO data set covers all manufacturing at the 3-digit level of aggregation from 1963
to 1998 for a sample of 64 countries, providing information on employment and value added
on an annual basis. Table 3 indicates the countries for which the data are available and Table
5 reports the index of technological diversiﬁcation for each sector, with the corresponding
(average) size of the sector in manufacturing. We compute the sample average of labor
productivity for each country and sector. As a measure of volatility, we use the 5-year
variance of labor productivity (value added per worker) growth.
To check the consistency of the prediction, we ﬁrst regress the (log of) sectoral labor
productivity on the level of development, proxied by the (log of) real GDP per capita of
the country, controlling for sector-speciﬁc dummies. The regression yields a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient: As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 6, the point estimate for the
elasticity is 0.70 (with a country-clustered standard error of 0.07). This means that, on
average, any given sector is signiﬁcantly less productive in poor countries.
Similarly, we regress the (log of) sectoral variance on the level of development, including
sector-speciﬁc dummies. We obtain a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, displayed in the
second column of Table 6. The estimated elasticity is −0.30 (with a country-clustered
standard error of 0.10), implying that, on average, every sector is signiﬁcantly more volatile
in poor countries.
• For a given sector, productivity and volatility are negatively correlated.
Because poor countries use less complex technologies for any given sector, this implies
that the within-sector relationship between volatility and productivity should be negative.
To check this implication, we regress the (log) level of volatility on the (log) level of labor
productivity, controlling for sectoral dummies. The estimated coeﬃcient, reported in Table
7, is negative and signiﬁcant: We obtain an elasticity of −0.29 (with a country-clustered
standard error of 0.10).
Prediction 3. More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile. A mean-
variance frontier might not exist.
24• More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile.
This is a direct prediction of production with “technological diversiﬁcation.” To test
this prediction, we use the measures of labor productivity and volatility computed from the
UNIDO data set we referred to before.
Central to this test is the construction of a measure of technological complexity. Following
Clague (1991), we measure the technological complexity of a sector by the diversity of inputs
it uses. A sector is more complex if it uses more varieties of capital goods. There are two
practical shortcomings with this measure of complexity. First, there are no comprehensive
data on sector-level input usages for most countries in the sample. Second, even if the data
were available, the actual extent of complexity observed would respond endogenously to the
level of development of the country and the relative abundance of skilled labor.
To address these issues, we use the approach followed by Clague (1991) and Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and calculate the complexity measures for sectors in the U.S. There are two
key assumptions for the validity of the test we will perform: First, there are technological
reasons why some industries demand a relatively larger number of capital goods than others.
Second, these technological diﬀerences persist across countries, leading to a positive corre-
lation between the rankings of technological complexity in the United States and any other
given country.22 More formally, as discussed after equation (30), we treat these complexity
measures as a proxy for unobserved technological complexity that is not explained by the
sector’s skill intensity and relative size.
To calculate our measure of technological diversity, we use the 1997 Capital Flow Tables
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This table distinguishes 180 capital good categories
(structures, equipment, and software), each usually corresponding to a 6-digit 1997 NAICS
category. We then measure technological diversiﬁcation as the inverse the Herﬁndahl index of
investment expenditure shares. Table 5 reports the (log) technological diversiﬁcation index
for each of the sectors in our sample.
The simple correlation between (log of) labor productivity and our index of technological
diversity is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (without and with country-speciﬁc dummies).
However, one might argue that this strong positive correlation might be driven by other
determinants. For example, capital intensity is likely to be correlated with the level of
technological diversiﬁcation and also to inﬂuence productivity. Incidentally, our model also
predicts that the skill intensity of the sector also inﬂuences the productivity of the sector. The
ﬁrst column in Table 8 shows the within-country regression results, after controlling for the
additional potential determinants of labor productivity. We control for the share of materials
in the sector, its skill and capital intensity (measured by the share of skilled or semi-skilled
workers in production and the value of equipment per worker, respectively), and the relative
22A meaure of technological complexity based on the U.S. is a noisy measure of the complexity of a sector in
other countries. As Raddatz (2003) argues, to the extent that the noise corresponds to classical measurement
error, the coeﬃcients we are interested in will be biased towards zero, against the hypothesis of our study.
25size of the sector. The regression shows that technological diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcantly and
positively correlated with the level of labor productivity. A one-standard-deviation increase
in the measure of technological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 3 percent increase in the
level of productivity. Also in line with our predictions, skill intensity raises productivity.
The same considerations stated before lead us to include a similar set of controls in the
regression of (log) variance on the extent of technological diversiﬁcation. The results are
summarized in the second column of Table 8. Technological diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcantly
and negatively associated with sectoral volatility. A one-standard-deviation increase in tech-
nological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the volatility of the sector.
Volatility also decreases with skill intensity and, as we later document in more detail, the
size of the sector.
• There is no evidence of a mean-variance frontier.
As discussed before, portfolio-view models predict a positive correlation between mean
productivity and variance. However, in the data, the simple correlation between volatility
and productivity is negative (−0.10 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). Controlling for
sectoral size, and country- and sector-speciﬁc eﬀects yields no positive relationship between
the two variables. Using a diﬀerent approach, Koren and Tenreyro (2004) also reject the
notion that countries move along a mean-variance frontier in the data.
Our model is consistent and, in fact, predicts the absence of a mean-variance frontier:
As countries develop, they use more sophisticated technologies, which leads both to higher
productivity and lower variance.
Prediction 4. Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence
riskier sectors. Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex sec-
tors. This also implies that poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
• Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence riskier sectors.
Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex sectors.
As seen in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, skill intensive sectors will endogenously become more
complex. This implies that skill abundant countries have a comparative advantage in com-
plex sectors. Note that even a small diﬀerence in skill abundance can result in a large
comparative advantage because of directed technical change.
That poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex sectors was ﬁrst
documented by Clague (1991). He ﬁnds that poor countries are relatively less eﬃcient in
industries with a lower index of technological complexity (where complexity is measured
similarly to the method employed in the present paper).
This pattern of comparative advantage, according to the model, implies that poor coun-
tries should specialize in less complex sectors. We checked this implication, by examining
the sectoral composition of the economy. Using the UNIDO data set, we regressed the (log)
26average sectoral shares on a) the index of technological diversiﬁcation of the sector; b)t h e
level of development, proxied by the (log) level of GDP of the country; and c) the inter-
action between sectoral variance and the level of development. According to the model,
the interaction term should be positive: As countries develop, they should move to more
complex sectors. The results are displayed in Table 9. The interaction term is positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, consistent with the model.
• Poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
To check whether the pattern of comparative advantage might also imply that poor
countries specialize in relatively more volatile sectors, we regress the (log) average sectoral
shares on i) the variance of the sector; b) the (log) of GDP of the country; and c)t h e
interaction between sectoral variance and the level of development. As the model predicts,
the regression yields a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction term, implying
that more developed countries tend to specialize in lower-variance sectors. The results are
displayed in Table 10, which shows the regressions without and with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Prediction 5. Larger sectors, in which the country has a comparative advantage are less
volatile.
Proﬁts for an individual machine owner are larger in large sectors (with more machine
operators), ceteris paribus. Hence more machines will be attracted toward large sectors,
making them less volatile. (See equation (30).) The size of the sector, in turn, is determined
by its comparative advantage, implying that sectors with a comparative advantage are less
volatile than sectors with comparative disadvantage.
Table 11 shows that sectors with a larger share of employment are less volatile even
when controlling for country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. This remains true of we control for
other sectoral characteristics such as capital and skill intensity, and technological complexity
(Table 8).
Canning, Amaral, Lee, Meyer and Stanley (1998) explored the relationship between GDP
volatility and the size of the economy, ﬁnding that variance falls with size with an elasticity
of about 1/6. We ﬁnd very similar elasticities for the size of a sector. Note that if all risks are
idiosyncratic to individual workers or machines, the fall in volatility should be faster, with
an elasticity of 1. Canning et al. argue that interactions across economic actors magnify the
aggregate importance of idiosyncratic risk. An alternative explanation for why idiosyncratic
shocks are important in the aggregate is provided by Gabaix (2004). He shows that if the size
distribution of ﬁrms has an inﬁnite variance (such as, for example, a Pareto distribution),
the decay of idiosyncratic risk with respect to size is slower. In our model, we can account
for the slow decay of volatility with size if we assume that each machine has a random
productivity drawn from a Pareto distribution. Then, we will have few very productive
machines employing many operators. Idiosyncratic shocks to these machines then have a
large eﬀect on aggregate productivity.
27In our model, the size of a sector is endogenously determined by comparative advantage:
sectors that use the abundant factor intensively are relatively larger. Instead of identifying all
the necessary factors of production for each sector, we measure the “revealed” comparative





where Xis/Xi is the share of sector s in total manufacturing exports of country i and Xws/Xw
is the same sectoral share for the world. We use exports data from the Trade and Production
Database of the World Bank, which merges product-level trade ﬂow data from UN Comtrade
with sector level production data from UNIDO. World export is measured as total exports
of the 64 countries for which trade data exist in all 28 manufacturing sectors.
Table 12 reports the results of regressing log variance of sectoral productivity on the log of
its revealed comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is associated with signiﬁcantly
lower volatility even when controlling for country and sector ﬁxed eﬀects. A one-standard-
deviation increase in revealed comparative advantage leads to 8 to 14 percent lower variance.
3.1 Robustness
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks for our empirical results. First,
some institutions may facilitate the response to external sectoral shocks. Since rich countries
have better institutions, this may contribute to lower output volatility. We therefore look at
the role of ﬁnancial development and labor market ﬂexibility in reducing volatility.
Financial development makes raising capital cheaper and faster. Hence if ﬁrms are hit
by liquidity shocks, they can borrow the necessary funds without signiﬁcantly disrupting
production. This can make the productivity of ﬁrms smoother, especially over shorter hori-
zons. Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2004) show how the liquidity needs of
long-term investments make output volatile in ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries. Em-
pirically, Braun and Larrain (forthcoming) and Larrain (2004) have shown that ﬁnancial
development makes output less volatile, especially in highly ﬁnance dependent sectors.
Our model can easily incorporate the pattern that volatility declines with ﬁnancial
development. The development of new inputs requires ﬁnancing, because initial develop-
ment/installation costs have to be covered up front. The value of new machines will hence
be higher in ﬁnancially developed countries where the cost of capital is lower, making these
countries less volatile. Across sectors, diﬀerences in ﬁnancing needs (“external ﬁnance de-
pendence”) lead to similar predictions.
Column 2 of Table 13 reports the regression of sectoral variance on the level of GDP
and the degree of ﬁnancial development, gauged by private credit over GDP. We control for
sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Financial development leads to signiﬁcantly lower volatility, but
the eﬀect of general economic development also remains signiﬁcantly negative.
Our measure of volatility is the variance of labor productivity (value added per worker)
growth. This may be higher in countries with rigid labor markets, because ﬁrms are less
28able to react to demand shocks. For example, if the demand for the product of a particular
ﬁrm falls, optimally it would downsize its workforce. However, ﬁring costs and regulations
make this costly, so the ﬁrm retains its workers in the hope that the shock is transitory. In
the data we would observe this shock as if it were a negative productivity shock; less output
is produced with the same number of workers.
To see whether this measurement problem contaminates our results, we control for the
costs of modifying and terminating employment contracts across countries, as compiled by
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Schleifer and Lopez-de-Silanes (2004). As Column 3 of Table
13 shows, labor market rigidities signiﬁcantly increase the volatility of labor productivity
within any given sector. However, this does not alter our prediction that volatility declines
with development; in fact, the point estimate of the coeﬃcient of GDP is greater in absolute
value. Intuitively, some highly developed countries have rather rigid labor markets (notably
European countries) but are still highly stable in terms of labor productivity.
In Column 4, we control for both ﬁnancial development and labor market rigidities. The
eﬀect of overall economic development is still highly signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient very similar
to our benchmark estimates.
An alternative explanation for the decline of volatility with development is that high-income
countries specialize in diﬀerentiated products, which are subject to idiosyncratic demand
and supply shocks. This could result in lower volatility because idiosyncratic shocks wash
out when aggregated over many products. Also, if sectors producing multiple diﬀerentiated
products use a wider variety of inputs, then “output diversiﬁcation” is correlated with “input
diversiﬁcation,” which potentially biases our results on technological diversiﬁcation.
To test for the presence of output diversiﬁcation, the use of ﬁrm-level data would be
desirable. Lacking such data, however, we can use data on the number of establishments
reported by UNIDO. If products are diﬀerentiated by producer ﬁrms and these products are
subject to idiosyncratic demand or supply shocks, the volatility of a sector should decline
with the number of ﬁrms.
Our model also predicts that larger sectors should be less volatile. The distinction be-
tween the two theories relies in the margin through which this takes place. Output diversiﬁ-
cation takes place across ﬁrms, hence volatility declines with the number of ﬁrms (extensive
margin) but not with the average size of ﬁrms (intensive margins). In our model, larger ﬁrms
attract proportionately more machines, and hence both margins are equally important.
To test the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins, we decompose the
size of sector s in country i, Lis, into the number of ﬁrms and the average size of ﬁrms,
lnLis =l nNis +l n ( Lis/Nis).
We then regress the log variance of a sector on the log number of ﬁrms and the log of their
average size, controlling for both country- and industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The output
diversiﬁcation would suggest that the number of ﬁrms decreases volatility while ﬁrm size
29does not. Table 14 reports our results. Both the extensive and the intensive margins of
sector size contribute to lower volatility, and, in line with our theory, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the importance of the two. Moreover, when we only focus on “complex” sectors,
where product diﬀerentiation may be more prevalent, there are still no signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
This suggests that “output diversiﬁcation” does not signiﬁcantly contribute to the decline
in volatility.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model in which the production process makes use of diﬀerent input
varieties, which are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. As in other expanding variety
growth models, technological progress takes place as an expansion in the number of input
varieties, increasing productivity. The new insight we develop is that the expansion in
varieties also leads to lower volatility of production via two channels. First, as each individual
variety matters less and less in production, the contribution of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations to
overall volatility declines. Second, each additional input provides a new adjustment margin
in response to external shocks, making productivity less volatile.
In the model, the number of varieties evolves endogenously in response to proﬁt incentives.
The consequent change in volatility associated with changes in the number of varieties feeds
back into the investment and savings decisions of producers.
The model yields empirical predictions concerning the relationships among productivity,
volatility, technological complexity, and comparative advantage. We discuss these predictions
in light of the existing empirical evidence and provide novel ﬁndings supporting the results.
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A Approximating the Discrete State Space Markov Process with
a Diﬀusion
In this section we formalize the diﬀusion approximation for the number of machines, relying
on limit theorems for birth and death processes in Stone (1963) and Iglehart (1965).
32Let n follow a continuous-time birth and death process with birth rate A and death rate
bn. That is, we assume that a new machine is ﬁnished after an exponential time, with arrival
parameter A measuring the investment into new machines. Making the arrival of machines
random takes care of potential integer problems: since the arrival of a ﬁnished machine
only depends on the current intensity of investment, we do not need to track how much
investors have invested since the building of the last machine. In what follows, we assume
A is constant.
The instantaneous mean and variance of this process are
E(dn)=( A − bn)dt,
Var(dn)=( A + bn)dt.
Let ξA =( n − A/b)/
√











What happens as A tends to inﬁnity? The process ξA weakly converges in the Markov sense
to a diﬀusion process
dξ∞ = −bdt +
√
2dz.
Proof. This requires (Stone 1963) that, in any compact interval of R, (1) the state space of
ξA becomes dense and (2) the instantaneous mean and variance of ξA converge uniformly to
−b and 2.
(1) Let [I1,I 2] ⊂Rbe a compact interval and x ∈ [I1,I 2] an arbitrary point in the interval.
For each A there exists an integer kA for which
(kA − A/b)/
√
A ≤ x<(kA +1− A/b)/
√
A.
T h ed i s t a n c eo fx to the closest element of the state space of ξA is hence smaller than
1/
√
A. That is, for any ε>0, there exists an element of the state space in the ε-
neighborhood of x as long as A>1/ε2. This proves that the state space becomes dense
in [I1,I 2]a sA →∞ .
(2) Clearly, the instantaneous mean and variance of ξA converge to −b and 2, we just need
to establish uniformity. Let ξa ∈ [I1,I 2]. The for any ε there exists an A0 =( bI2/ε)2
such that |bξa/
√
a| <εas long as a>A 0.
33Note that if ζA is a diﬀusion process described by
dζA =( A − bn)dt +
√
A + bndz,
its transformation (ζA − A/b)/
√
A also weakly converges to ξ∞.
That is, for large enough A, the birth and death process will be well approximated by a
diﬀusion process with corresponding instantaneous mean and variance.
B An Example with Fixed-Coeﬃcients Technology
In the benchmark model we assume that σ ∈ (0,1), that is, the elasticity of substitution
across machine varieties is bigger than 1 (the machines are gross substitutes). This is a
standard assumption in the expanding variety literature and is needed to ensure that the
varieties not yet invented (or installed) are not essential in production.
However, complementarities across diﬀerent inputs (or tasks) may be an important fea-
ture of the development process. As Kremer (1993) points out, many production processes
feature an “O-ring” technology: even if a single input fails, it may jeopardize the whole
outcome. (Also see Young (1993) and Grossman and Maggi (2000)) on the importance of
complementarities for productivity patterns.) We hence consider an example in which all
the machine varieties are essential in production. We show that even in the extreme form
of complementarity (O-ring), technological diversiﬁcation may still take place via variable
capacity utilization.
In particular, the production function takes the Leontief form:
Y =m i n
i=1,...,n
{xi}.
The services of individual machine varieties are produced as before, with skilled operators,
xi = hi. We assume, however, that the failure of the machine does not render it completely
useless (otherwise log output would become minus inﬁnity), but, rather, makes it more
expensive to operate. In particular, while good machines require 1 unit of skill labor, broken
machines require δ>1 units.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the case without variable capacity utilization, that is, when the
number of operators per machines is constant at h. This implies that when the ﬁrst machine
fails, output drops from h to h/δ. (Further failures have no impact on output.) So the
change in log output is
∆lnY = −lnδ.
Since the ﬁrst failures arrives after an exponentially distributed working time with an arrival
rate of γn, the instantaneous variance is
Var(dln Y )/dt =( l nδ)
2γn.
This is in fact increasing in n; the more complex the technology, the more likely a machine
failure is. We do not have an oﬀsetting eﬀect from the law of large numbers because the
working machines do not substitute for the broken one.
34Consider now the case with variable capacity utilization. In this case, we let ﬁrms reshuﬄe
operators across machine varieties, only holding the total number of operators ﬁxed at H =
nh. If a machine “fails,” the ﬁrm allocates more operators to that machine to partially oﬀset
this negative productivity shock. With free reallocation of operators, it is optimal to equalize
the services of each machine variety at, say, x. This requires δx operators on the broken
machine and (n−1)x operators on the rest. The total number of operators is unchanged, so
δx+( n − 1)x = nh.
The change in log output is hence
∆lnY =l nn − ln(n − 1+δ),
which is negative, that is, output still drops but it drops by less than without VCU. The
ﬁrm can successfully mitigate some of the impact of the shock with VCU.
The instantaneous variance in this case is
Var(dlnY )/dt = [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)]
2γn.
The ﬁrst part decreases with n. The more machine varieties there are, the more possibilities
there exist to reshuﬄe operators without aﬀecting output too much. The second part is
increasing in n because more complex technologies fail more often. In general the eﬀect
of technological complexity on volatility is hence ambiguous. Nonetheless, as complexity
increases without bound (n →∞ ), the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and volatility goes to zero,
lim
n→∞
Var(dlnY )/dt =0 .
To see this, use the intermediate value theorem to rewrite [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)] as (δ −
1)/[n + ξn(δ − 1)], where ξn ∈ [0,1]. Since ξn is bounded, [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)]2 = O(n−2)
and γn = O(n).
In summary, the ability to vary capacity utilization can make more complex technologies
less volatile even in the case of fully complementary inputs.
C Data Appendix
Variable Deﬁnitions
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country in 1997, measured in 1995 international
dollars. [WDI, PWT]
Population Population of the country in 1997. [WDI]
Yield volatility Variance of the log of annual wheat yield. [FAOSTAT]
35Rainfall volatility Variance of cumulated log changes in precipitation. Precipitation data
are recorded monthly at several meteorological stations within a country. Because
many stations do not report data in all months, we take the average of year-on-year
changes for all months and all stations within the country. We cumulate these changes
to obtain the country’s deviation from long-run precipitation trends. [Global Historical
Climatology Network]
Temperature volatility Variance of cumulated changes in temperature, calculated in the
same way as rainfall volatility. [Global Historical Climatology Network]
Change in oil price Two-year change in the U.S. CPI-deﬂated price of West Texas Inter-
mediate oil.
Diverse powerplants dummy Takes the value of one if the concentration of powerplants
by type (conventional, hydroelectric, nuclear, renewable) in the country is below the
median. [International Energy Annual]
Technological Diversiﬁcation The log of the inverse of the Herﬁndahl index of concen-
tration of equipment purchases across diﬀerent varieties of capital goods. A sector has
a high Technological Diversiﬁcation index if it purchased many diﬀerent capital goods.
[1997 Capital Flow Tables]
Average Share in Manufacturing The sector’s share in manufacturing employment, av-
eraged across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Labor Productivity Value added per worker in 1995 dollars, averaged across the sample
period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Variance of Productivity The variance of 5-year growth of value added per worker in
1995 dollars across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Skill Intensity The fraction of production workers in the 3-digit ISIC sector that are em-
ployed in skilled or semi-skilled occupations. [Occupational Employment Statistics]
Share of Materials The share of intermediate inputs in total sales. [NBER-CES Manu-
facturing Industry Database]
Equipment per Worker, Structure per Worker [NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database]
Revealed Comparative Advantage The share of sector s in country i’s manufacturing
export relative to the world average. [Trade and Production Database]
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371 Introduction
Economies at early stages of the development process are often shaken by abrupt changes
in growth rates. In his inﬂuential paper, Lucas (1988) brings attention to this fact, noting
that “within the advanced countries, growth rates tend to be very stable over long periods
of time,” whereas within poor countries “there are many examples of sudden, large changes
in growth rates, both up and down.” This negative relationship between the volatility of
growth rates and the level of development is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the standard
deviation of annual growth rates against the level of real GDP per capita for a large cross
section of countries.
In an attempt to understand the sources of volatility, Koren and Tenreyro (2004) quantify
the contribution of various factors at diﬀerent stages of development, ﬁnding that the high
volatility in poor countries is due to 1) higher levels of sectoral concentration, 2) higher levels
of sectoral risk (that is, poor countries not only specialize in few sectors, but those sectors
also tend to bear particularly high risk), and 3) higher country-speciﬁc macroeconomic risk.
A volatility accounting exercise carried out by these authors indicates that approximately 50
percent of the diﬀerences in volatility between rich and poor countries can be accounted for
by diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of the economy (higher concentration and sectoral
risk), whereas the other 50 percent is due to country-speciﬁc risk. These characteristics
of the development process, as we later explain, are inconsistent with previous theoretical
explanations of the dynamics of volatility and development. The purpose of this paper is to
provide an alternative theory that is in line with the empirical evidence.
To that end, we develop an endogenous growth model of technological diversiﬁcation.
The key idea of the model is that ﬁrms using a larger variety of inputs can mitigate the
impact of shocks aﬀecting the productivity of individual inputs. This takes place through
two channels. First, with a larger variety of inputs, each individual input matters less in
production, and productivity becomes less volatile by the law of large numbers. Second,
whenever a shock hits a particular input, ﬁrms can adjust the use of the other inputs to
partially oﬀset the shock. This second channel operates even if production exhibits an
extreme form of complementarity (as in Kremer (1993)’s O-ring technology). Both channels
make the productivity of ﬁrms using more sophisticated technologies less volatile.
The idea can be illustrated with an example from agriculture: Growing wheat with only
land and labor as inputs renders the yield vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks (for example,
weather shocks such as a severe drought). In contrast, using land and labor together with ar-
tiﬁcial irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc., makes wheat-growing not only more productive
but also less risky, because farmers have more options to react to external shocks. Figure
2 provides a graphical illustration of this example. It displays the volatility of wheat yield
(calculated as the standard deviation of percentage deviations from the country’s average
1yield) of the 20 biggest wheat producers against their level of GDP per capita.1 Yield volatil-
ity falls sharply with development. This remains true if we control for diﬀerences in climate
across countries, including the volatility of rainfall and temperature (see Table 1).
The shocks aﬀecting individual inputs or individual production techniques may come from
various sources. Another example of such a shock could be a sudden change in the price of a
major input of a production technique. Countries with a diverse set of available techniques
can cope better with the shock. For instance, the types of power plants that countries rely on
to generate electricity vary with development. Small and less-developed countries have only
a few plants very highly concentrated on one particular technique of electricity production
(employing either traditional thermal or hydroelectric plants). Developed countries, on the
other hand, have access to nuclear and renewable-resource plants and are typically more
diversiﬁed. Firms in these countries will react diﬀerently to oil price shocks. Table 2 reports
how the electricity production of countries responds to oil price changes. The electricity
production of less-developed and small countries concentrated on few types of power plants
is signiﬁcantly more sensitive to oil price shocks than that of countries with a diverse set
of plants. More speciﬁcally, while the electricity production of countries concentrated on
a single energy source drops by about 1 percent after a 30 percent oil price hike, there is
no such drop for diversiﬁed countries. Firms in countries with diverse sources of electricity
can mitigate the negative impact of an oil price shock by substituting away from oil. The
share of oil in total energy consumption falls by 0.3 percent after a 30 percent oil price hike,
whereas no substitution takes place in concentrated countries.
We next turn to the questions of what determines technological diversiﬁcation and why
poorer countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. We extend the model to allow for
international mobility of goods and for cross-country diﬀerences in endowments. Much as in
models of endogenous growth and directed technical change, the technological complexity of
a sector in a given country evolves endogenously in response to the incentives of the creators
and users of new technologies. In particular, more input varieties will be directed towards
sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage, making them more complex and
less volatile. The stage of development of the country will also matter, because inventing
and/or using the new inputs is subject to increasing returns to scale. Countries accumulate
new inputs as they develop, which brings about a gradual decline in their volatility. The
speed of development, and hence the speed with which volatility declines, may be inﬂuenced
by the initial level of volatility. If investment risk is harmful for growth, which is the case
for a range of plausible parameter values in our model, then poor and volatile countries will
1Note that agricultural technology varies substantially with development. For example, of the top 20
wheat producers, India uses 2.3 tractors per 1,000 acres of arable land; this number is 128.8 for Germany.
Fertilizer use also varies hugely. India uses 21.9 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers per acre; Germany uses 183.8
tons. We take the level of development as an overall indicator of agricultural sophistication.
2develop slower and will remain highly volatile for long periods.2
The model delivers clear-cut predictions about the relationship among technological di-
versiﬁcation, volatility, and productivity. Using sector-level data for a broad sample of
countries, we provide empirical support for these predictions. First, any given sector is less
volatile in developed countries. This result holds if we control for the quality of institutions
which may facilitate a smoother response to external shocks, such as ﬁnancial development
and the ﬂexibility of the labor market. Second, within a given country, large, skill inten-
sive sectors using complex technologies are less volatile. This is consistent with our model
which says that new inputs/technologies will be directed towards such sectors, thus reduc-
ing volatility. These two mechanisms lead to a decline in aggregate volatility as a country
develops: The economy experiences less volatility in each sector and resources move towards
relatively safer sectors.
The link between volatility and development has been studied before by Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), and Obstfeld (1994),
who describe the technology choice as a portfolio decision: In order to reap the beneﬁts of
high productivity and high growth, an economy has to bear more risk. The risk tolerance
typically relates to the level of development and the ﬁnancial structure of the economy.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)’s model also features increasing returns to scale: Early in
the development process diversiﬁcation opportunities are limited, owing to the scarcity of
capital and the indivisibility of investment projects. This feature can explain the high levels
of sectoral concentration observed in poor countries. However, all these models predict
that at early stages of development countries will tend to specialize in safer (even if less
productive) sectors as a way of seeking insurance. This prediction is not borne out by the
data: Koren and Tenreyro (2004) document that poor countries are highly concentrated
in sectors that bear particularly high volatility. In addition, these authors ﬁnd that most
developing countries are inside the “mean-variance frontier,” being highly prone to specialize
in high-variance, low-mean sectors. These ﬁndings contradict the predictions of the portfolio-
based models and suggest that important constraints must be at play, preventing developing
countries from investing in safer and, at the same time, more productive assets.3
Our model departs from the portfolio view of the world that features a necessary trade-oﬀ
between volatility and performance at the sector level. It can then naturally accommodate
the fact that poor countries tend to exhibit high sectoral concentration and also that the high
concentration falls mainly on high-risk sectors. In addition, unlike in previous contributions,
2See Angeletos and Calvet (2001) and Angeletos (2004) for a discussion of how volatility aﬀects investment.
Note, however, that in these papers there is no explanation for why volatility is higher in the ﬁrst place. See
also Ramey and Ramey (1995) on the empirical evidence.
3Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) document that, for highly
developed countries, industrial specialization tends to increase with development. However, as we later show,
this does not result in higher aggregate volatility because these sectors tend to be technologically diversiﬁed
and are hence more stable than the rest of the economy. The fact that the higher specialization of rich
countries does not increase their aggregate risk has also been shown by Koren and Tenreyro (2004).
3the volatility of individual sectors in our model is endogenous: It depends on the level of
development and the comparative advantage of the country.4
Our paper is related to previous work by Kraay and Ventura (2001). As in their paper,
the open-economy version of our model features the prediction that rich countries have a
comparative advantage in less-volatile sectors. The diﬀerence lies in the way this result is
achieved. In Kraay and Ventura (2001), high-skill sectors, which are prevalent in developed
countries, enjoy less-elastic product demand. Markups can then serve as a buﬀer against
productivity shocks, reducing the volatility of high-skill sectors. For example, a drop in
output of a diﬀerentiated product makes that product more expensive in the world market.
This terms of trade improvement partly oﬀsets the original shock. On the other hand, no
such “terms-of-trade insurance” is taking place for homogenous products that poor countries
specialize in.
There are, however, empirical objections to the mechanism proposed by Kraay and Ven-
tura (2001) and its implications. The model predicts a negative relationship between produc-
tivity shocks and terms-of-trade ﬂuctuations (particularly negative for developed countries).
That is, negative productivity shocks should be associated with an improvement in the terms
of trade. In the data, however, the relationship between ﬂuctuations in labor productivity
and the terms of trade is somewhat positive, and there is no diﬀerence between rich and
poor countries in terms of this relationship.5
Finally, our model builds on a vast literature on endogenous growth models in which
the development of new varieties of goods enhances productivity. (See for example, Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).) The contribution of our paper is to provide a
uniﬁed framework for the explanation of development and volatility. We provide sectoral
evidence for a broad cross-section of countries that conﬁrms the predictions of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we discuss the empirical implications and oﬀer novel evidence in support. We
summarize and conclude in Section 4.
2 A Model of Technological Diversiﬁcation
2.1 Technological diversiﬁcation, productivity, and volatility
In this section, we introduce a production process that features technological diversiﬁcation:
Input varieties contribute not only to higher productivity but also, because inputs are subject
to imperfectly correlated shocks, to lower volatility.
4As Koren and Tenreyro (2004) have shown, diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of developed and
less-developed countries account for about 50 percent of the diﬀerence in volatility.
5It is possible that other factors are at play, blurring the predicted relationship; at this point, nonetheless,
we can say that the extent of countercyclicality in the terms of trade is not the prima facie mechanism behind
the negative relationship between development and volatility.











where Xi is capital services from capital variety i , n denotes the number of working machines
and 1/(1 − σ) ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.6
Machines can fail randomly, in which case they irreversibly cease to contribute to produc-
tion. We assume that failure occurs independently across machines and time periods with
probability γ dt. That is, the lifetime of a machine is exponentially distributed with param-
eter γ. For our argument we need only that failures are imperfectly correlated. We take the
extreme assumption of independence for expositional clarity. The assumption that random
failures turn the machine completely useless makes the model more tractable, since we need
only keep track of the number of working machines. However, technological diversiﬁcation
would still take place with less terminal shocks: Appendix B considers an example where
there is only a partial drop in productivity after a machine failure.
In an open-economy context, changes in the world price of the input or sudden disrup-
tions of trade could also be an important source of input-speciﬁc shocks. Technological
diversiﬁcation can mitigate the impact of such shocks.
Using machines in production involves increasing returns to scale: Machines are indi-
visible. This means that anyone operating a machine has to buy one unit of the machine
beforehand. This minimum scale requirement limits the scope of diversiﬁcation across ma-
chine varieties.7
Since we are interested in the inner workings of a sector and how technology choice aﬀects
volatility, we posit increasing returns at the input level. Indivisibility and minimum scale
requirements are inherent characteristics of many an input used in technologically advanced
sectors. Note that increasing returns are also a feature of the use of the machines, not
only their invention or production. That is, we assume that machines can be produced and
bought in any quantity but only a full unit is productive.
The setup of a machine requires κ units of the ﬁnal good. Once the machine is set up,
the owner gains monopoly power over its services. This monopoly lasts until the machine
(exogenously) becomes obsolete, that is, the lifetime of the “patent” is the same as the
lifetime of the machine and is exponentially distributed with parameter γ.
6As usual in endogenous growth models, we assume that σ>0, that is, machines are gross substitutes.
Appendix B considers an example when this is not the case. Introducing additional (scarce) factors of pro-
duction would not change our qualitative results, it would just make the returns to variety more decreasing.
7Note that there is no incentive to install two or more units of a single machine variety, both because the
production function features a “love of variety” and because machines are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. A
similar assumption is made by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who work with minimum scale requirements
at the industry level.
5We assume that the machine can be used with diﬀerent intensities by employing “oper-
ators.”Machine i can provide twice as much service if operated by twice as many workers.8
Producing a unit of capital service requires one unit of labor (by appropriate deﬁnition of
labor units).
Formally, the services of machine i at time t are:
Xit =
 
lit, if Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
0, otherwise;
(2)
where Ki0 is the amount of capital devoted to machine variety i, lit is the number of operators,
and Ti is the exponentially distributed lifetime of the machine.
Consider the output of a ﬁrm, using n types of machine services, with Xi units of each,
Y = n
1/σXi. (3)
As is apparent from (3), productivity is increasing in the number of varieties holding the
amount of each individual variety ﬁxed. This is the usual “love of variety” eﬀect of many en-
dogenous growth models (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991). The eﬀect is stronger
the lower is σ, that is, the less substitutable machines are. Intuitively, if machines are highly
substitutable, any additional variety is less needed.
As Xi also denotes the number of operators working on machine i, the overall number of
machine operators working at the ﬁrm is L = nXi. Hence (3) can be rewritten as
Y = n
1/σ−1L. (4)
Productivity is also increasing in the number of machines if we hold the total number of
operators (L) constant (since σ<1). The dependence is weaker than in (3), because any
new machine requires operators taken away from old machines.
This implies that we have two alternative deﬁnitions of productivity, one holding the
operators per machine constant, the other holding the total number of operators constant.
We think both measures are useful, since the adjustment across diﬀerent machine varieties
can take place relatively fast within the ﬁrm (in particular, no hiring or ﬁring of workers or
capital installation is needed).9
Given that the number of machines is a random variable (individual machines fail at
random and there is a ﬁnite number of machines), productivity will be random, too. What
8This is a way of capturing endogenous capacity utilization which is recently emphasized in business cycle
studies. Allowing for capacity constraints or decreasing returns to capacity utilization would not alter our
setting qualitatively. First, capacity constraints would not bind in equilibrium. Economic growth takes place
via the expansion of machine varieties while the services of an individual variety shrink. Second, investors
will be interested in the total, not the marginal proﬁt when deciding whether to build a machine. This will
remain positive even with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, if the cost function were isoelastic, the
share of proﬁt in total revenue would be constant, just as in the present formulation.
9The eﬀectiveness of this margin depends on how quickly and how eﬃciently machine operators can
switch between diﬀerent machines. Our assumption that any worker can operate any machine captures the
6happens to output when a machine fails? First, the number of machines becomes n − 1,
making output lower for any given Xi. However, the demand for the services of an individual
machine will also change. Again, it will be important to distinguish between the two measures
of productivity. First, if we hold the number of operators per machine constant, productivity
drops from n1/σ to (n−1)1/σ. However, if we allow operators to be reallocated evenly among
the remaining machines, the drop in output will be smaller, because we have allowed the
ﬁrm to adjust the capacity utilization of the remaining machines in response to the shock.
Productivity drops from n1/σ−1 to (n − 1)1/σ−1, so the proportional drop is smaller.
The variance of productivity changes declines with the number of machines for both pro-
ductivity measures. In the ﬁrst case, this is just an application of the law of large numbers:
Since output is an average (more precisely, a CES aggregate) of imperfectly correlated indi-
vidual machine services, proportional changes in productivity become less and less volatile
as the number of machines increases. The second case displays an additional eﬀect: The
more machine varieties the ﬁrm uses, the better they can respond to shocks by employing
the remaining inputs at diﬀerent intensities. Qualitatively, both eﬀects imply that volatility
declines with “technological complexity” (n). However, important diﬀerences arise when
individual inputs are complements rather than substitutes of each other (such as in the O-
ring production function of Kremer (1993)). Then the law of large numbers does not apply,
because aggregate productivity is no longer an average of individual productivities. Still, as
we demonstrate in Appendix B, volatility will fall with technological complexity if we allow
for the second margin, variable capacity utilization.
To derive the variance of productivity formally, let a denote the log of productivity when
the number of operators per machine (Xi) is held constant.




(Lower-case letters denote logarithms.) On the other hand, if we hold the total number of
operators constant at L,w eh a v e˜ a, the log of productivity, allowing for variable capacity
utilization (VCU).
˜ a = y − l = φlnni,
where we have introduced the notation φ =1 /σ − 1.
Our measures of volatility will be the variance of the changes in these two TFP variables:






VolVCU = Var(dy|n,L) = Var(d˜ a|n)=φ
2 Var(dln n|n).
extreme case when such a switch is immediate and fully eﬃcient. In reality, of course, we would see less
than perfect ﬂexibility. However, as the skills needed to work with advanced technology are very diverse
(for example, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) document that computerization increased the demand for
non-routine cognitive tasks), we believe that such adjustment is important in practice.
7Let us for the moment assume away growth in the number of machines and study what
happens to existing machines over time. (We introduce growth in the next section). The
number of machines, in the absence of investment, changes because machines break at ran-
dom.10 Given that machine lifetimes are exponentially distributed with parameter γ and
lifetimes are independently distributed, the ﬁrst failure comes after an exponentially dis-
tributed time with parameter ntγ.
Tk ∼ exp(γ),
Tmin =m i n
k=1,...,n
{Tk}∼exp(ntγ).
The ﬁrst failure reduces the number of machines by one, so
nt+h =
 
nt if h<T min,
nt − 1 otherwise.
The probability of no machine failure over a period of length h is 1 − e−ntγh. The expected
change in the number of machines is
E(nt+h − nt|nt)=−e
−ntγh,






If we take h → 0, we get the instantaneous mean and variance of the number of machines,
E(dnt|nt)=−γnt dt,
Var(dnt|nt)=γnit dt.
More formally, in the absence of investment, the number of machines follows a continuous-
time, discrete-space Markov process known as a “pure death” process with death rate γnt.
Such a process can be well approximated by an Itˆ o process if nt is large. (See Appendix A.)
That is, for large nt, the changes in the number of machines in a dt period of time will be
approximately normal. This is just a version of the central limit theorem for discrete-space
Markov processes. In the next section we allow for growth in the number of machines. The
economy will then exhibit long-run growth in nt, implying that the approximation will get
better and better over time.
10Investment in new machines also changes the number of machines, but only gradually, because only a
ﬁnite ﬂow of investment will be allocated to new machines at any point in time. That is, investment does
not contribute to the volatility of the number of machines. Formally, investment follows a bounded variation
process. Even if we allowed for “jumps” in the number of new machines (say, investors could borrow a whole
machine abroad), we are interested in the productivity shock before such an investment response takes place.
Note that we are also assuming away integer problems of investment here. See Appendix A for a formal
treatment of the number machines as a discrete-state Markov process.
8Consequently, abstracting from growth, we can express the evolution of nt using the
following stochastic diﬀerential equation,
dnt = −γnt dt +
√
γnt dz,
where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Given this approximation for dnt,
we can use Itˆ o’s lemma to write dlnnt as follows:
dlnnt = −γ(1 + 0.5/nt)dt +
 
γ/nt dz.
What is important here is that the volatility of the log number of machines declines with
the existing number of machines. Even though as nt gets big, the ﬁrst failure gets more and
more likely, the proportional (that is, log) drop in the number of machines it induces is less
and less important. As is standard in statements of the law of large numbers, the second
eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst one. In other words, diversiﬁcation across several machines makes
log productivity less volatile.
Given that nt measures the number of inputs subject to diﬀerent shocks, we take it
as an index of technological complexity. It is clear from (3) and the discussion above that
technological complexity both increases average productivity and reduces the volatility of
productivity. In the next section, we endogenize the investment in new machines, and
consequently, the resulting level of technological complexity.
2.2 Endogenous technological complexity
What determines the level of technological complexity in the long run? In this section we
endogenize the decision to invest in machines. Much as in models of endogenous growth
(Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992), machine owners will
be attracted by greater proﬁt opportunities.
We ﬁrst look at a one-sector economy to bring out the relationship between volatility
and development clearly. In Section 2.3, we introduce multiple sectors and investigate how
the relative complexity of sectors evolve endogenously. As we have documented in Koren
and Tenreyro (2004), intrinsic volatility diﬀerences across sectors together with countries’
diﬀerent patterns of specialization are responsible for an important portion of the diﬀerence
in output volatility between rich and poor countries. As in other multi-sector models of
endogenous technology, we will have directed technical change (Acemoglu 2002, Caselli and
Coleman 2000). Proﬁts per machine variety will depend on the size of the sector (number
of available operators), its relative wage, the degree of competition (number of existing
machines), and trade openness.
Technology will be the same as in (1), which results in the following aggregate production
function for the ﬁnal good (4):
Y = n
φL.
The economic environment is characterized as follows. The ﬁnal good sector is perfectly
competitive, that is, ﬁrms take output and input prices as given. In contrast, machine
9providers act as monopolistic competitors, that is, they are price setters for their own machine
but take the overall price of the composite machine varieties as given.11
There is a continuum of symmetric consumers/investors with unit mass. Each consumer
has access to the well-diversiﬁed mutual fund of all machines. They can trade the share
of this mutual fund freely, instantly, and in any quantity (even shorting is allowed). This
will ensure that the mutual fund is priced by the consumer’s stochastic discount factor.
In other words, we assume no frictions in the domestic ﬁnancial market. Note that there
is no positive supply of a riskless asset in the economy, in other words, every production
technology is risky.12 Each consumer supplies L units of labor inelastically in the labor
market. Consumers decide how much to consume and how much to invest in the mutual
fund of machines, taking the rate of return and wage rate as given.
Time is continuous and consumers maximize lifetime expected utility over consumption









subject to a standard intertemporal budget constraint,
dai =[ ( µP + D/P)ai + wL− Ci]dt + σPai dz.
The change in the asset holding of consumer i,d ai, comes from capital gains (µP)a n d
dividend yield (D/P) on the asset and from labor income (wL) minus consumption (Ci).
As we later show, stock prices follow a diﬀusion process, so asset holdings of consumer i will
also follow a diﬀusion with instantaneous volatility σPai. The mean and variance of the rate
of return on machines generally depends on the state of the economy, that is, the number of
machines.
To derive the equilibrium of the economy, let us ﬁrst consider the pricing decisions of


















j and ﬁnal demand Y as
given, the machine owner faces a constant elasticity demand curve with elasticity 1/(1−σ).
11Note that this is a valid assumption even if there is a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent machine varieties. First,
the market share of each machine owner falls at the rate 1/n, whereas the standard deviation of output is
of order 1/
√
n. That is, even if n is large enough to make monopolistic competition a realistic assumption,
we still have positive aggregate volatility. Second, volatility falls with the number of independent machine
varieties, which may be smaller than the number of machine owners if some of the machines are subject to
common shocks or if there are interactions across machine-operating ﬁrms.
12Alternatively, the rate of return on a riskless asset (for example, storage) is so low that investors do not
demand a positive amount.
10She will hence follow a constant markup rule when pricing its services. The optimal
monopoly price of each capital service will be
χi = w/σ,
where w is the wage rate. Final good prices are, in turn, determined from the price of the
services of an individual machine and the number of machines.
Proﬁt maximization implies that price equals marginal cost in the ﬁnal good sector. We











This implies that wages increase in productivity:
w = n
φ.




Xi = nXi = L.
The markup rule also implies that proﬁts are a constant, (1/σ − 1) = φ, share of wages.
Total wages are wL, hence the wage costs of a single machine operating ﬁrm are wL/n (by
symmetry), implying that proﬁts are
πi = φwL/n. (6)
The owner of a machine uses this proﬁt ﬂow to calculate the lifetime cash-ﬂow of the machine.
Investors take the number of installed capital varieties, the wage rate, capital prices, and the
return on equity as given.
We assume free entry into the machine market. This means that any investor can buy
κ units of ﬁnal good and install a new machine variety. As long as there is positive entry,
this pins down the value of a machine at V = κ.13 We further assume that the sunk cost
required to install a machine is falling with the level of technological progress, n, because of
spillovers or learning-by-doing externalities. In particular, it falls at a rate φ − 1t oe n s u r e
balanced growth. Expanding variety growth models usually make a similar assumption to
ensure long-run growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Chapter 3). Alternatively, one could
set φ = 1 by restricting the elasticity of substitution across varieties to be 2. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 6) put restrictions on the elasticity of substitution across input
varieties. Either assumption delivers balanced growth and qualitatively similar results.
13If V< κ , no new machines are built and the growth rate is zero. We will later verify that this is not an
equilibrium.
11Also, we assume that ﬁxed costs are proportional to the overall size of the economy, L.
This assumption ensures that the growth rate is not dependent on country size. (See Jones
(1995) on the “scale eﬀect” of endogenous growth models.) Recall that κ measures the unit
of a machine variety that is subject to variety speciﬁc shocks. Arguably, bigger countries use
more capital of each variety and therefore require a bigger investment. Our main results are
not sensitive to this assumption. The only result that would change without this assumption














w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dw = nφ and κ = κ0Lnφ−1. The dividend yield is higher the higher the
proﬁt rate and the lower the ﬁxed cost of installing a machine. The assumption of falling
ﬁxed costs ensured that the dividend yield does not vanish as n increases. If the dividend
yield tended to zero as n became large, we would obtain a steady-state distribution of n
instead of an ever-growing economy.
Note that even if the dividend yield on a machine is constant, the rate of return is
random, because there are random capital losses due to machine failures. This results in an
average depreciation rate (and hence capital loss) γ∆t over a period ∆t, but this capital loss
i sr a n d o me v e na sw et a k e∆ t → 0. We next turn to characterizing the stochastic process
driving the value of machines.
Let Pts denote the period-s value of all the machines installed at time t. At the time of
installation, Ptt = ntV . However, after an exponential lifetime the ﬁrst machine fails and
Pts becomes (nt − 1)V . The ﬁrst failure occurs with probability 1 − e−γnh over an interval
h.T a k i n gh → 0, we get the following mean and variance for the change in the value of the
machines
E(dPt)=−γntV dt = −γPt dt,
Var(dPt)=γntV
2 dt = γP
2
t /ndt.
We use the same arguments put forward before for the number of machines and approximate
the value of machines by a diﬀusion process:
dP/P = −γ dt +
 
γ/ndz. (9)
Once we know the rate-of-return process for stocks (which, recall, are the only form of
investment), we can use the Euler equation to determine the optimal consumption/saving
policy.







dt +d ( MP)
 
=0 ,
where M is marginal utility, Mt = e−ρtC
−θ
t , D is the dividend on an asset, and P is its price.
This holds whenever investors can freely trade the asset (as is assumed here).
Because of complete domestic ﬁnancial markets, both marginal utility and the stock price
follow a geometric diﬀusion process driven by the same shock dz. The asset pricing equation
then simpliﬁes to
µM + D/P + µP + σMσP =0 ,
where µM is the proportional drift and σ2
M is the proportional variance of marginal utility
(for example, Cox and Huang (1989)). The expected change in the discounted asset price
(inclusive of dividends) can be zero only if the sum of all drift terms is zero.












dt − θσc dz,
where µc and σ2
c refer to the proportional drift and diﬀusion of C, respectively. Marginal
utility declines with impatience and with the mean consumption growth rate and increases
with consumption volatility (that is, the convexity of marginal utility gives rise to precau-
tionary saving motives). Substituting this formula in the asset pricing equation results in










where r(n) refers to the sum of dividend yield and mean price decrease of stocks.
The mean growth rate of consumption depends positively on the mean rate of return,
with a coeﬃcient equal to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ.A t t h e s a m e
time, because the consumer’s portfolio is risky, its covariance with consumption will make
saving less attractive and will hence result in lower consumption growth. Given that we have
complete markets, in other words, there is only one source of uncertainty in the economy,
the instantaneous correlation between stock prices and consumption is 1, so the covariance
is σcσP. Finally, since future consumption is risky, prudent consumers have precautionary
savings depending on the volatility of consumption and the degree of prudence, (θ +1 ) /2.









13In general, consumption also depends on the state of the economy, n.L e t C = v(n)b e
the policy function that describes the optimal amount of consumption given the number of














































where we have omitted the argument n from v(n) for brevity.
The growth rate of machines, µn, depends on investment, which, in turn, depends on the
consumption policy. By equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market,
Y = n
φL = v(n)+( µn + γ)nκ = v(n)+( µn + γ)n
φκ0L. (12)
Total output has to equal the value of consumption plus investment. Investment is the sum
of net investment (µn) and the replacement of broken machines (γ).
Equations (11) and (12) together with σ2
n = γ/n deﬁne a second-order ordinary diﬀer-
ential equation for v, which has two linearly independent solutions. We therefore need two
boundary conditions to pin down the optimal policy function, v(n). One is that no con-
sumption takes place without capital, v(0) = 0. The other one comes from the fact that as n
becomes arbitrarily large, σ2
n becomes zero and the economy resembles a non-stochastic Ram-
sey model. Consumption growth in the non-stochastic Ramsey model is given by ˜ µc = r−ρ,






=˜ µc = r − ρ.
To obtain an analytical solution, we put restrictions on the CRRA and the elasticity of
substitution across machine varieties and assume that θφ =1 . 14 Whether this is plausible
depends on how broadly we interpret machine varieties. If these are diﬀerent intermedi-
ate inputs necessary to produce a particular good, the inputs may be strong complements,
in which case the elasticity is less than one. This would lead to a negative φ which we
have ruled out (but see Appendix B for an example of such a production function). How-
ever, if we think of machine varieties as representing alternative production techniques that
can highly substitute each other, then higher elasticities are more plausible. For example
the elasticity of substitution across goods produced in diﬀerent countries (within a narrow
14For other values of relative risk aversion, numerical techniques can be applied to solve (11). If θ<1/φ,
then the saving rate is increasing in n. Intuitively, low-θ consumers are less prudent, so the precautionary
motive is relatively small. This means that risk aversion dominates and saving declines with volatility. In
this case, poor countries develop slowly because their excess volatility discourages investment. The reverse
is true for θ>1/φ. Similarly to Angeletos (2004), we have the cutoﬀ at an IES less than one (RRA greater
than one) because capital does not exhaust all income as long as φ<1.
14product category) is estimated to be around 4–7 (Hummels 2001). Estimates based on the
time series of U.S. imports are usually lower, in the range of 1–2 (Gallaway, McDaniel and
Rivera 2003). For an intermediate range of 3–4, the value of φ is 1/2–1/3, resulting in a θ of
2–3. This is plausible both as a measure of relative risk aversion and as an inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).
Proposition 1. If θφ = 1, the optimal policy function, v(n) takes the form v0nφ,w h e r ev0
is given by
v0 =( 1− φ)L + ρκ0L. (13)
Proof. Direct substitution reveals that whenever v0 satisﬁes (13), v0nφ satisﬁes (11). For
this policy function, v  n2/n = φ(φ − 1), v n/v = φ,a n dµn is independent of n.S i n c ev0nφ
also satisﬁes the boundary conditions, it is a unique solution.
Deﬁning the value of all the machines as K = nκ, equation (13) can be rewritten in terms
of aggregate variables as
Y − C = φY − ρK =( φ − ρκ0)Y,
since the capital output ratio in this economy is nκ0Lnφ−1/(nφL)=κ0. Investors save (and
invest) a constant fraction of current output. The saving rate is increasing in the proﬁt rate
(φ) and decreasing in the degree of impatience (ρ) and sunk cost of investment (κ0).
From (12), we can express the growth rate of the number of machines as
µn = φ/κ0 − γ − ρ,
resulting in an output growth rate of
φµn = φ(φ/κ0 − γ − ρ).
This completes the characterization of the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. Countries
with high proﬁt rates and low investment costs will develop faster, implying both a faster
growth of output and a faster fall of volatility. In the next section, we extend the model in
two directions in order to account for the diﬀerences in specialization patterns between rich
and poor countries.
2.3 A two-sector model of technological diversiﬁcation
In this section, we allow for a richer characterization of the economy, by extending the model
to a two-sector economy. The sectors diﬀer in the extent of skill intensity. We introduce a
multi-country setup, allowing for cross-country diﬀerences in endowments and compare the
results for closed and open economies. Allowing for international trade, as we later show,
can explain the observation that poor countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. In
fact, comparative advantage magniﬁes the diﬀerences in volatility between poor and rich
countries through its eﬀect on the patterns of specialization.
15Let us assume that there are two sectors, one producing a capital good Yk, the other



















Both sectors use the same CES technology, but they have access to a diﬀerent set of machines.
In particular, the number of machines in the two sectors will (endogenously) be diﬀerent.
The owner of each machine will decide which sector to operate in. The total number of
machines nk + nc is denoted by n.
We assume that machines in the capital good sector are operated by skilled labor, whereas
those in the consumption good sector are operated by unskilled labor.15 Note that machines
are a metaphor for technology in our model so this amounts to assuming that some tech-
nologies are skilled labor intensive, whereas others are unskilled labor intensive. Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998) show that computerization has increased the demand for skilled labor.
However, previous technological advances such as the industrial revolution and the introduc-
tion of the production line relied more on unskilled rather than skilled workers (James and
Skinner 1985, Goldin and Katz 1998). In this paper, we think of the skilled-labor intensive







hit, if i ≤ nk, Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
lit, if nk <i≤ n, Ki0 = κ and t<T i;
0, otherwise.
(14)
Here hit denotes the number of skilled operators and lit the number of unskilled operators
of variety i,a n dκ and Ti are deﬁned, as previously, as the ﬁxed cost of building a machine
and the random lifetime of machine i.
Let H denote the overall stock of skilled labor in the economy and L the stock of unskilled







15Any positive diﬀerence in skill intensity is suﬃcient for our results; we assume this extreme diﬀerence in
skill intensity for tractability.
16In Section 3 we discuss how we identify technological complexity in the data.
16Similarly to the one-sector case, the productivity of a ﬁrm in sector i will be increasing in






Both sectors are perfectly competitive. Each producer takes the wage rate and the set of
machine varieties available to the sector as given.
What determines the allocation of machines across the two sectors? Again, investors
will maximize proﬁts and move toward sectors with better proﬁt opportunities. The price
of machine service i will be marked up over the skilled wage in the capital good sector and
over the unskilled wage in the unskilled sector:
χi =
 
wH/σ, if i ≤ nk;
wL/σ, if nk <i≤ n,
where wH denotes skilled, wL denotes unskilled wages. This makes proﬁt per machine a
constant φ fraction of wages per machine:
πi =
 
φwHH/nk, if i ≤ nk;
φwLL/nc, if nk <i≤ n.
In long-run equilibrium, the rate of return on machines in the two sectors have to be equal.








with ω = wH/wL denoting the skill premium.
The number of machines in a sector is proportional to the total wage bill of the sector.
Whenever (17) fails to hold, that is, one of the sectors has relatively few machines, that
sector has more proﬁts per machine than the other one. Investors will then move machines
across sectors (if machines are movable), or invest only in the more proﬁtable sector until
the equality is resolved.
We assume that machines are freely and instantly movable across sectors. This assump-
tion ensures that rk = rc at any time in any state of the world, implying that (17) holds at
any point in time.17 Since (17) would always hold in the long run, we only need this assump-
tion to simplify the transitional dynamics: If machines can instantly adjust across sectors
17Formally, the present discount value of a machine is pkκ in both sectors. If the dividend yield in one
sector is higher than in another, an investor could buy one unit of high-dividend stock and short one unit
of low-dividend stock. Since the prices of the two stocks always move in parallel, this strategy presents an
arbitrage opportunity with positive net dividends in all future periods and no price risk. Absence of arbitrage
hence implies the equalization of dividend yields.
17then the economy will immediately jump to its balanced-growth path. Because the machines
are movable across sectors, the single state variable is the total number of machines, n.
Equation (17) describes a version of directed technical change, as in Acemoglu (2002) or
Caselli and Coleman (2000): Machine varieties are directed towards the sector with a higher
share in employment. On the one hand, this is a size eﬀect: if there are many operators
in a sector, it is more proﬁtable to operate machines there and hence more machines will
move towards this sector. On the other hand, there is also a relative price eﬀect: If the skill
premium is high, the relative price of the capital good is high, so proﬁts are higher in the
capital good sector.
Since the ﬁnal good sectors are competitive, the relative price of the capital good will







If there are more machines allocated to the capital sector, it becomes more productive, and
its relative price falls.
2.3.1 The closed economy
In a closed economy, the relative price is determined by the relative supply and demand of






where A is a constant and ε is the elasticity of substitution between capital and consumption



























As we will show, the nominal saving rate in the economy is constant, which means that
pkYk/Yc is constant. This implies that the relative demand for the consumption and the









Since we have assumed 0 <φ<1, the relative number of machines is increasing in the
relative amount of skilled labor in the economy. However, a 1 percent increase in skill
abundance induces a less than 1 percent increase in the relative number of machines in the
capital good sector. This is because the abundant factor (more precisely, the good that
18uses the abundant factor intensively) becomes cheaper and hence less proﬁtable for machine
owners. This relative price eﬀect has been pointed out by Acemoglu (2002).
The ﬁxed cost required to build a machine is assumed to arise in capital goods. In terms
of consumption goods, the ﬁxed cost is pkκ. The mean rate of return on machines is the




− γ = φ
wHH/nk
pkκ






where we have made use of the facts that capital good prices equal marginal costs (wHn
−φ
k )
and that the sunk cost is falling at the rate φ−1, κ = κ0Lnφ−1. Relative to (8), the important
diﬀerence is that the rate of return is falling in the relative complexity of the capital good
sector. The number of machines aﬀects proﬁtability in two ways. First, more machines make
the capital sector more productive and hence more proﬁtable (productivity is proportional
to n
φ
k). Second, competition increases in the number of machines, because machines compete
for a scarce supply of operators (H). This second eﬀect lowers proﬁts proportionally with
n, so it dominates the ﬁrst for φ<1.
The relative demand for capital and consumption goods will be determined by the
consumption-saving decision. Since the mutual fund holds all machines in both sectors,
the Euler equation of the consumer is the same as in (11), but the growth rate of machines
and the return on machines may be diﬀerent.











As before, we conjecture that optimal consumption is given by v0nφ, which, by the equilib-















The Euler equation simpliﬁes to µn = r − ρ. Substituting from (22) and (23), we see that

















Note that v0 does not depend on n, implying that the allocation of machines across sectors
as well as the relative prices are independent of development. In other words, the economy
exhibits balanced growth. This also means that the saving rate is constant as previously
claimed.
192.3.2 A small open economy
Suppose instead that the country is a small open economy freely trading the output of the
two ﬁnal good sectors at an exogenously given world relative price. We assume that the
individual machine varieties cannot be traded. In other words, investors can buy foreign
capital goods and install them in their own country as machines, but the physical machines
installed abroad cannot contribute to production.18 This assumption ensures that countries
cannot circumvent the ﬁxed costs of machine operation by importing machine services from
abroad and hence cannot fully diversify instantly. The number of machines in the country
will hence be a state variable that can only be adjusted gradually. At any given point in time,
the number of available machines and hence overall technological complexity is given. In
the long run, investment in new machines will determine technological complexity, economic
development, and volatility.
Trade is balanced at any point in time, ruling out international borrowing and lending.
This also means that investment is ﬁnite (growth in the number of machines is gradual) in
every instant, because the country has only ﬁnite ﬂow output to oﬀer in exchange for foreign
capital goods. In contrast, if we allow for borrowing, investors can immediately borrow to
replace a broken machine, smoothing out some of the shock to productivity. We assume away
such consumption smoothing behavior because the current accounts of countries (especially
those of less-developed ones) do not seem to act as buﬀers against productivity shocks.19
Let ˜ pk denote the world price of capital. We then have from (18)













Conditional on the levels of productivity in the two sectors, the world relative price of the two
goods completely determines the relative wage. All else equal, a higher relative price of the
capital good (high ˜ pk) leads to a higher relative wage of the factor which is used intensively
in that sector (high ω). This is the FPE part. At the same time, the more productive the
capital good sector is relative to the consumption good sector, the higher the relative wage
of skilled labor.
18If we interpret machine varieties as diﬀerent techniques of production, this amounts to very costly
imitation and no technology spillovers across countries. Comin and Hobijn (2004) document a relatively
slow adoption of leading technologies developed elsewhere. A positive but ﬁnite cost of technology adoption
could be modeled such that machine varieties already in use abroad have a lower installation cost ˜ κ<κ .A
˜ κ>0 would be suﬃcient to deliver qualitatively similar results.
19Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) show that the beta coeﬃcient of consumption response to output shocks of
countries is close to one.
20Note that, as standard in small open-economy models with free trade, the production
structure is independent of demand considerations. Relative demand for the two sectors (in
our case, the consumption/investment decision) will matter only for the patterns of trade.











Notice that, similarly to the closed economy case, (21), the relative number of machines in
the capital sector increases in skill abundance. However, the dependence on skill abundance
is stronger, 1/(1 − φ), because we no longer have an oﬀsetting relative price eﬀect. This is
just the Rybczynski theorem applied to directed technical change.
The impact is also greater than in the case of pure factor price equalization. The reason
for this is that machines ﬂow towards the sector that already has a comparative advantage,
making it relatively more productive. This becomes an additional source of comparative
advantage. In other words, the initial comparative advantage gets magniﬁed by directed
technical change. Our model says that even small human capital diﬀerences can account for
large diﬀerences in specialization patterns and, hence, in the relative volatilities of sectors.
2.4 Extension to multiple sectors
Suppose now that there are S sectors, each using the same CES technology but requiring
diﬀerent levels of skill for machine operation. In particular, sector s requires that each
operator possesses at least hs amount of human capital, and we order sectors such that
hS >h S−1 > ... > h1. The output of machine i in sector s is
Xis =
 
hslit, if Ki0 = κ,a n dt<T i;
0, otherwise,
where lit is the number of workers on machine i who are “qualiﬁed” to operate the machine
in the sense that they have a level of human capital higher than hs.
There are altogether L workers in the economy, and their human capital endowment is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F(h). The number of workers
capable of operating machines in sector s is hence [1 − F(hs)]L. The two-sector case of
Section 2.3 is a special case of this framework, with a fraction of people having high human
capital (skilled workers) and the rest having low human capital (unskilled workers).
Given the number of machines in each sector, (n1,n 2,...,nS), labor market equilibrium
requires that each worker be employed on machines that require the highest skill level that
this worker can supply.20
20To prove this, suppose there exists a worker with human capital level hj ≥ hs+1 (that is, capable of
working in sector s + 1) working in sector s. This worker is not willing to switch to sector s + 1 because
ws+1 <w s. But all workers in sector s+1 are capable of operating sector s machinery, and they would earn
higher wages in that sector. Hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
21This implies that a fraction 1−F(hS) of workers is employed in sector S, and a fraction




where αs is deﬁned as the share of workers in sector s, F(hs+1) − F(hs) (deﬁned for all s
with h0 =0 ,hS = ∞). Proﬁts per machine are a constant, (1 − σ), fraction of revenues per
machine,
πs =( 1− σ)˜ psn
φ−1
s hsαsL,
where ˜ ps is the price of product s determined in world markets. Directed technical change
will equate per-machine proﬁts across sectors, πs = πz, so the relative number of machines









A sector will use relatively more machines if it is producing an expensive good, it is skill
intensive, or has a bigger pool of workers with matching skills. Such sectors are also more
productive and less volatile. In other words, given the overall number of machines, n =
n1 + n2 + ... + nS, technological complexity and productivity are increasing, while volatility
is decreasing in the sector’s skill intensity and its share in total employment.
The variance of sector s in country i is φ2γ/nis, so we can write the log variance as
lnVaris =2l nφ +l nγ − lnnis = νi − [ln ˜ ps +l nhs +l n ( Lis/Li)]/(1 − φ), (30)
where νi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect.
This is a key equation for our empirical exercise. While we can measure a sector’s skill
intensity and its share in employment, we do not observe ˜ ps, the price of the sector’s output
in world markets. Instead, we interpret it broadly as an unobserved sector-speciﬁc variable
that aﬀects the level of complexity, capturing not only variations in the value of output but
also, for example, technological diﬀerences across sectors. Note that this variable is common
across countries within a given sector, so we can control for it using either sector ﬁxed eﬀects
or observing technological complexity in any given country.
3 Productivity, Volatility, and Technological Complexity: The
Empirical Evidence
The model developed in the previous sections leads to a set of predictions concerning the
relationships among productivity, volatility, and technological diversiﬁcation. We discuss
these predictions in light of the empirical evidence.
Prediction 1. GDP volatility declines with development.
22This is one of the stylized facts in the literature and the main motivation of this paper.
There are large cross-country diﬀerences in volatility. The standard deviation of annual GDP
growth during the period 1970 through 2000 ranges from 1.4 percent to 21.8 percent (a factor
of 15) across 167 countries. The most volatile decile of countries had a standard deviation of
GDP growth of 12.9 percent. This is seven times as high as the volatility of the least volatile
decile (1.8 percent). This cross-country variation in volatility is highly correlated with the
cross-country variation in the level of development, gauged by real GDP per capita. More
speciﬁcally, as shown in Table 4, the elasticity of GDP variance with respect to GDP per
capita is −0.326 (with a robust standard error of 0.066).21
In the model, investment in new machines brings about development and a gradual decline
in volatility. Countries that have few machines are both less developed and more volatile.
In the multi-sector version, our model proposes two channels to explain this negative asso-
ciation. First, a within-sector channel, whereby a given sector exhibits higher technological
complexity in more-developed countries. This, in turn, implies that a given sector is both
more productive and less volatile in developed countries. Second, a compositional channel,
whereby poor countries specialize in relatively less complex sectors. This implies that poor
countries concentrate in sectors with (absolute) lower productivity and higher variance. In
what follows, we check the empirical consistency of the predictions associated with these two
channels.
Prediction 2. For any given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies. This
implies that for any sector, a) poor countries are both less productive and more volatile and
b) productivity and volatility are negatively correlated.
• For a given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies.
Various studies have explored the process of technology diﬀusion across countries. For
example, Caselli and Coleman (2000), document that the adoption of computers depends
heavily on the level of development of the country, and, more speciﬁcally, on the level of
human capital. Caselli and Wilson (2004) show that this result extends to a broader set of
high-technology equipment (where the extent of technology embodied in capital equipment
is measured as the R&D content).
Our model implies that these cross-country diﬀerences in technology are also present
within sectors. Since directed technical change equates the rates of return on machines in
all sectors, poor countries will use proportionately fewer machines in all sectors, holding
comparative advantage patterns constant.
The two examples mentioned in the introduction suggest important cross-country tech-
nological diﬀerences for a given sector: Developed countries tend to use more agricultural
machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides in agriculture and have access to more types of power
plants in the energy sector. Recent empirical studies provide additional support for this
21Table 3 presents the list of countries included in the computation.
23observation. For example, Comin and Hobijn (2004) document how speciﬁc technological
innovations have spread across countries. Many of these innovations are relevant only to
certain sectors (for example, mule spindle, blast oxygen furnace, internal combustion engine,
aviation). The authors show that most innovations originated in developed countries and
spread gradually to less-developed countries. This implies that in any given year, in all
relevant sectors, poor countries use less sophisticated production techniques than rich ones.
• For a given sector, poor countries are both less productive and more volatile.
In the context of our model, the previous ﬁnding, in turn, implies that a given sector
is both less productive and more volatile in poor countries. We test this prediction using
sectoral data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2002).
The UNIDO data set covers all manufacturing at the 3-digit level of aggregation from 1963
to 1998 for a sample of 64 countries, providing information on employment and value added
on an annual basis. Table 3 indicates the countries for which the data are available and Table
5 reports the index of technological diversiﬁcation for each sector, with the corresponding
(average) size of the sector in manufacturing. We compute the sample average of labor
productivity for each country and sector. As a measure of volatility, we use the 5-year
variance of labor productivity (value added per worker) growth.
To check the consistency of the prediction, we ﬁrst regress the (log of) sectoral labor
productivity on the level of development, proxied by the (log of) real GDP per capita of
the country, controlling for sector-speciﬁc dummies. The regression yields a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient: As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 6, the point estimate for the
elasticity is 0.70 (with a country-clustered standard error of 0.07). This means that, on
average, any given sector is signiﬁcantly less productive in poor countries.
Similarly, we regress the (log of) sectoral variance on the level of development, including
sector-speciﬁc dummies. We obtain a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, displayed in the
second column of Table 6. The estimated elasticity is −0.30 (with a country-clustered
standard error of 0.10), implying that, on average, every sector is signiﬁcantly more volatile
in poor countries.
• For a given sector, productivity and volatility are negatively correlated.
Because poor countries use less complex technologies for any given sector, this implies
that the within-sector relationship between volatility and productivity should be negative.
To check this implication, we regress the (log) level of volatility on the (log) level of labor
productivity, controlling for sectoral dummies. The estimated coeﬃcient, reported in Table
7, is negative and signiﬁcant: We obtain an elasticity of −0.29 (with a country-clustered
standard error of 0.10).
Prediction 3. More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile. A mean-
variance frontier might not exist.
24• More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile.
This is a direct prediction of production with “technological diversiﬁcation.” To test
this prediction, we use the measures of labor productivity and volatility computed from the
UNIDO data set we referred to before.
Central to this test is the construction of a measure of technological complexity. Following
Clague (1991), we measure the technological complexity of a sector by the diversity of inputs
it uses. A sector is more complex if it uses more varieties of capital goods. There are two
practical shortcomings with this measure of complexity. First, there are no comprehensive
data on sector-level input usages for most countries in the sample. Second, even if the data
were available, the actual extent of complexity observed would respond endogenously to the
level of development of the country and the relative abundance of skilled labor.
To address these issues, we use the approach followed by Clague (1991) and Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and calculate the complexity measures for sectors in the U.S. There are two
key assumptions for the validity of the test we will perform: First, there are technological
reasons why some industries demand a relatively larger number of capital goods than others.
Second, these technological diﬀerences persist across countries, leading to a positive corre-
lation between the rankings of technological complexity in the United States and any other
given country.22 More formally, as discussed after equation (30), we treat these complexity
measures as a proxy for unobserved technological complexity that is not explained by the
sector’s skill intensity and relative size.
To calculate our measure of technological diversity, we use the 1997 Capital Flow Tables
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This table distinguishes 180 capital good categories
(structures, equipment, and software), each usually corresponding to a 6-digit 1997 NAICS
category. We then measure technological diversiﬁcation as the inverse the Herﬁndahl index of
investment expenditure shares. Table 5 reports the (log) technological diversiﬁcation index
for each of the sectors in our sample.
The simple correlation between (log of) labor productivity and our index of technological
diversity is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (without and with country-speciﬁc dummies).
However, one might argue that this strong positive correlation might be driven by other
determinants. For example, capital intensity is likely to be correlated with the level of
technological diversiﬁcation and also to inﬂuence productivity. Incidentally, our model also
predicts that the skill intensity of the sector also inﬂuences the productivity of the sector. The
ﬁrst column in Table 8 shows the within-country regression results, after controlling for the
additional potential determinants of labor productivity. We control for the share of materials
in the sector, its skill and capital intensity (measured by the share of skilled or semi-skilled
workers in production and the value of equipment per worker, respectively), and the relative
22A meaure of technological complexity based on the U.S. is a noisy measure of the complexity of a sector in
other countries. As Raddatz (2003) argues, to the extent that the noise corresponds to classical measurement
error, the coeﬃcients we are interested in will be biased towards zero, against the hypothesis of our study.
25size of the sector. The regression shows that technological diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcantly and
positively correlated with the level of labor productivity. A one-standard-deviation increase
in the measure of technological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 3 percent increase in the
level of productivity. Also in line with our predictions, skill intensity raises productivity.
The same considerations stated before lead us to include a similar set of controls in the
regression of (log) variance on the extent of technological diversiﬁcation. The results are
summarized in the second column of Table 8. Technological diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcantly
and negatively associated with sectoral volatility. A one-standard-deviation increase in tech-
nological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the volatility of the sector.
Volatility also decreases with skill intensity and, as we later document in more detail, the
size of the sector.
• There is no evidence of a mean-variance frontier.
As discussed before, portfolio-view models predict a positive correlation between mean
productivity and variance. However, in the data, the simple correlation between volatility
and productivity is negative (−0.10 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). Controlling for
sectoral size, and country- and sector-speciﬁc eﬀects yields no positive relationship between
the two variables. Using a diﬀerent approach, Koren and Tenreyro (2004) also reject the
notion that countries move along a mean-variance frontier in the data.
Our model is consistent and, in fact, predicts the absence of a mean-variance frontier:
As countries develop, they use more sophisticated technologies, which leads both to higher
productivity and lower variance.
Prediction 4. Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence
riskier sectors. Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex sec-
tors. This also implies that poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
• Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence riskier sectors.
Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex sectors.
As seen in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, skill intensive sectors will endogenously become more
complex. This implies that skill abundant countries have a comparative advantage in com-
plex sectors. Note that even a small diﬀerence in skill abundance can result in a large
comparative advantage because of directed technical change.
That poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex sectors was ﬁrst
documented by Clague (1991). He ﬁnds that poor countries are relatively less eﬃcient in
industries with a lower index of technological complexity (where complexity is measured
similarly to the method employed in the present paper).
This pattern of comparative advantage, according to the model, implies that poor coun-
tries should specialize in less complex sectors. We checked this implication, by examining
the sectoral composition of the economy. Using the UNIDO data set, we regressed the (log)
26average sectoral shares on a) the index of technological diversiﬁcation of the sector; b)t h e
level of development, proxied by the (log) level of GDP of the country; and c) the inter-
action between sectoral variance and the level of development. According to the model,
the interaction term should be positive: As countries develop, they should move to more
complex sectors. The results are displayed in Table 9. The interaction term is positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, consistent with the model.
• Poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
To check whether the pattern of comparative advantage might also imply that poor
countries specialize in relatively more volatile sectors, we regress the (log) average sectoral
shares on i) the variance of the sector; b) the (log) of GDP of the country; and c)t h e
interaction between sectoral variance and the level of development. As the model predicts,
the regression yields a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction term, implying
that more developed countries tend to specialize in lower-variance sectors. The results are
displayed in Table 10, which shows the regressions without and with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Prediction 5. Larger sectors, in which the country has a comparative advantage are less
volatile.
Proﬁts for an individual machine owner are larger in large sectors (with more machine
operators), ceteris paribus. Hence more machines will be attracted toward large sectors,
making them less volatile. (See equation (30).) The size of the sector, in turn, is determined
by its comparative advantage, implying that sectors with a comparative advantage are less
volatile than sectors with comparative disadvantage.
Table 11 shows that sectors with a larger share of employment are less volatile even
when controlling for country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. This remains true of we control for
other sectoral characteristics such as capital and skill intensity, and technological complexity
(Table 8).
Canning, Amaral, Lee, Meyer and Stanley (1998) explored the relationship between GDP
volatility and the size of the economy, ﬁnding that variance falls with size with an elasticity
of about 1/6. We ﬁnd very similar elasticities for the size of a sector. Note that if all risks are
idiosyncratic to individual workers or machines, the fall in volatility should be faster, with
an elasticity of 1. Canning et al. argue that interactions across economic actors magnify the
aggregate importance of idiosyncratic risk. An alternative explanation for why idiosyncratic
shocks are important in the aggregate is provided by Gabaix (2004). He shows that if the size
distribution of ﬁrms has an inﬁnite variance (such as, for example, a Pareto distribution),
the decay of idiosyncratic risk with respect to size is slower. In our model, we can account
for the slow decay of volatility with size if we assume that each machine has a random
productivity drawn from a Pareto distribution. Then, we will have few very productive
machines employing many operators. Idiosyncratic shocks to these machines then have a
large eﬀect on aggregate productivity.
27In our model, the size of a sector is endogenously determined by comparative advantage:
sectors that use the abundant factor intensively are relatively larger. Instead of identifying all
the necessary factors of production for each sector, we measure the “revealed” comparative





where Xis/Xi is the share of sector s in total manufacturing exports of country i and Xws/Xw
is the same sectoral share for the world. We use exports data from the Trade and Production
Database of the World Bank, which merges product-level trade ﬂow data from UN Comtrade
with sector level production data from UNIDO. World export is measured as total exports
of the 64 countries for which trade data exist in all 28 manufacturing sectors.
Table 12 reports the results of regressing log variance of sectoral productivity on the log of
its revealed comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is associated with signiﬁcantly
lower volatility even when controlling for country and sector ﬁxed eﬀects. A one-standard-
deviation increase in revealed comparative advantage leads to 8 to 14 percent lower variance.
3.1 Robustness
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks for our empirical results. First,
some institutions may facilitate the response to external sectoral shocks. Since rich countries
have better institutions, this may contribute to lower output volatility. We therefore look at
the role of ﬁnancial development and labor market ﬂexibility in reducing volatility.
Financial development makes raising capital cheaper and faster. Hence if ﬁrms are hit
by liquidity shocks, they can borrow the necessary funds without signiﬁcantly disrupting
production. This can make the productivity of ﬁrms smoother, especially over shorter hori-
zons. Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2004) show how the liquidity needs of
long-term investments make output volatile in ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries. Em-
pirically, Braun and Larrain (forthcoming) and Larrain (2004) have shown that ﬁnancial
development makes output less volatile, especially in highly ﬁnance dependent sectors.
Our model can easily incorporate the pattern that volatility declines with ﬁnancial
development. The development of new inputs requires ﬁnancing, because initial develop-
ment/installation costs have to be covered up front. The value of new machines will hence
be higher in ﬁnancially developed countries where the cost of capital is lower, making these
countries less volatile. Across sectors, diﬀerences in ﬁnancing needs (“external ﬁnance de-
pendence”) lead to similar predictions.
Column 2 of Table 13 reports the regression of sectoral variance on the level of GDP
and the degree of ﬁnancial development, gauged by private credit over GDP. We control for
sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Financial development leads to signiﬁcantly lower volatility, but
the eﬀect of general economic development also remains signiﬁcantly negative.
Our measure of volatility is the variance of labor productivity (value added per worker)
growth. This may be higher in countries with rigid labor markets, because ﬁrms are less
28able to react to demand shocks. For example, if the demand for the product of a particular
ﬁrm falls, optimally it would downsize its workforce. However, ﬁring costs and regulations
make this costly, so the ﬁrm retains its workers in the hope that the shock is transitory. In
the data we would observe this shock as if it were a negative productivity shock; less output
is produced with the same number of workers.
To see whether this measurement problem contaminates our results, we control for the
costs of modifying and terminating employment contracts across countries, as compiled by
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Schleifer and Lopez-de-Silanes (2004). As Column 3 of Table
13 shows, labor market rigidities signiﬁcantly increase the volatility of labor productivity
within any given sector. However, this does not alter our prediction that volatility declines
with development; in fact, the point estimate of the coeﬃcient of GDP is greater in absolute
value. Intuitively, some highly developed countries have rather rigid labor markets (notably
European countries) but are still highly stable in terms of labor productivity.
In Column 4, we control for both ﬁnancial development and labor market rigidities. The
eﬀect of overall economic development is still highly signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient very similar
to our benchmark estimates.
An alternative explanation for the decline of volatility with development is that high-income
countries specialize in diﬀerentiated products, which are subject to idiosyncratic demand
and supply shocks. This could result in lower volatility because idiosyncratic shocks wash
out when aggregated over many products. Also, if sectors producing multiple diﬀerentiated
products use a wider variety of inputs, then “output diversiﬁcation” is correlated with “input
diversiﬁcation,” which potentially biases our results on technological diversiﬁcation.
To test for the presence of output diversiﬁcation, the use of ﬁrm-level data would be
desirable. Lacking such data, however, we can use data on the number of establishments
reported by UNIDO. If products are diﬀerentiated by producer ﬁrms and these products are
subject to idiosyncratic demand or supply shocks, the volatility of a sector should decline
with the number of ﬁrms.
Our model also predicts that larger sectors should be less volatile. The distinction be-
tween the two theories relies in the margin through which this takes place. Output diversiﬁ-
cation takes place across ﬁrms, hence volatility declines with the number of ﬁrms (extensive
margin) but not with the average size of ﬁrms (intensive margins). In our model, larger ﬁrms
attract proportionately more machines, and hence both margins are equally important.
To test the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins, we decompose the
size of sector s in country i, Lis, into the number of ﬁrms and the average size of ﬁrms,
lnLis =l nNis +l n ( Lis/Nis).
We then regress the log variance of a sector on the log number of ﬁrms and the log of their
average size, controlling for both country- and industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The output
diversiﬁcation would suggest that the number of ﬁrms decreases volatility while ﬁrm size
29does not. Table 14 reports our results. Both the extensive and the intensive margins of
sector size contribute to lower volatility, and, in line with our theory, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the importance of the two. Moreover, when we only focus on “complex” sectors,
where product diﬀerentiation may be more prevalent, there are still no signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
This suggests that “output diversiﬁcation” does not signiﬁcantly contribute to the decline
in volatility.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model in which the production process makes use of diﬀerent input
varieties, which are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. As in other expanding variety
growth models, technological progress takes place as an expansion in the number of input
varieties, increasing productivity. The new insight we develop is that the expansion in
varieties also leads to lower volatility of production via two channels. First, as each individual
variety matters less and less in production, the contribution of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations to
overall volatility declines. Second, each additional input provides a new adjustment margin
in response to external shocks, making productivity less volatile.
In the model, the number of varieties evolves endogenously in response to proﬁt incentives.
The consequent change in volatility associated with changes in the number of varieties feeds
back into the investment and savings decisions of producers.
The model yields empirical predictions concerning the relationships among productivity,
volatility, technological complexity, and comparative advantage. We discuss these predictions
in light of the existing empirical evidence and provide novel ﬁndings supporting the results.
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A Approximating the Discrete State Space Markov Process with
a Diﬀusion
In this section we formalize the diﬀusion approximation for the number of machines, relying
on limit theorems for birth and death processes in Stone (1963) and Iglehart (1965).
32Let n follow a continuous-time birth and death process with birth rate A and death rate
bn. That is, we assume that a new machine is ﬁnished after an exponential time, with arrival
parameter A measuring the investment into new machines. Making the arrival of machines
random takes care of potential integer problems: since the arrival of a ﬁnished machine
only depends on the current intensity of investment, we do not need to track how much
investors have invested since the building of the last machine. In what follows, we assume
A is constant.
The instantaneous mean and variance of this process are
E(dn)=( A − bn)dt,
Var(dn)=( A + bn)dt.
Let ξA =( n − A/b)/
√











What happens as A tends to inﬁnity? The process ξA weakly converges in the Markov sense
to a diﬀusion process
dξ∞ = −bdt +
√
2dz.
Proof. This requires (Stone 1963) that, in any compact interval of R, (1) the state space of
ξA becomes dense and (2) the instantaneous mean and variance of ξA converge uniformly to
−b and 2.
(1) Let [I1,I 2] ⊂Rbe a compact interval and x ∈ [I1,I 2] an arbitrary point in the interval.
For each A there exists an integer kA for which
(kA − A/b)/
√
A ≤ x<(kA +1− A/b)/
√
A.
T h ed i s t a n c eo fx to the closest element of the state space of ξA is hence smaller than
1/
√
A. That is, for any ε>0, there exists an element of the state space in the ε-
neighborhood of x as long as A>1/ε2. This proves that the state space becomes dense
in [I1,I 2]a sA →∞ .
(2) Clearly, the instantaneous mean and variance of ξA converge to −b and 2, we just need
to establish uniformity. Let ξa ∈ [I1,I 2]. The for any ε there exists an A0 =( bI2/ε)2
such that |bξa/
√
a| <εas long as a>A 0.
33Note that if ζA is a diﬀusion process described by
dζA =( A − bn)dt +
√
A + bndz,
its transformation (ζA − A/b)/
√
A also weakly converges to ξ∞.
That is, for large enough A, the birth and death process will be well approximated by a
diﬀusion process with corresponding instantaneous mean and variance.
B An Example with Fixed-Coeﬃcients Technology
In the benchmark model we assume that σ ∈ (0,1), that is, the elasticity of substitution
across machine varieties is bigger than 1 (the machines are gross substitutes). This is a
standard assumption in the expanding variety literature and is needed to ensure that the
varieties not yet invented (or installed) are not essential in production.
However, complementarities across diﬀerent inputs (or tasks) may be an important fea-
ture of the development process. As Kremer (1993) points out, many production processes
feature an “O-ring” technology: even if a single input fails, it may jeopardize the whole
outcome. (Also see Young (1993) and Grossman and Maggi (2000)) on the importance of
complementarities for productivity patterns.) We hence consider an example in which all
the machine varieties are essential in production. We show that even in the extreme form
of complementarity (O-ring), technological diversiﬁcation may still take place via variable
capacity utilization.
In particular, the production function takes the Leontief form:
Y =m i n
i=1,...,n
{xi}.
The services of individual machine varieties are produced as before, with skilled operators,
xi = hi. We assume, however, that the failure of the machine does not render it completely
useless (otherwise log output would become minus inﬁnity), but, rather, makes it more
expensive to operate. In particular, while good machines require 1 unit of skill labor, broken
machines require δ>1 units.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the case without variable capacity utilization, that is, when the
number of operators per machines is constant at h. This implies that when the ﬁrst machine
fails, output drops from h to h/δ. (Further failures have no impact on output.) So the
change in log output is
∆lnY = −lnδ.
Since the ﬁrst failures arrives after an exponentially distributed working time with an arrival
rate of γn, the instantaneous variance is
Var(dln Y )/dt =( l nδ)
2γn.
This is in fact increasing in n; the more complex the technology, the more likely a machine
failure is. We do not have an oﬀsetting eﬀect from the law of large numbers because the
working machines do not substitute for the broken one.
34Consider now the case with variable capacity utilization. In this case, we let ﬁrms reshuﬄe
operators across machine varieties, only holding the total number of operators ﬁxed at H =
nh. If a machine “fails,” the ﬁrm allocates more operators to that machine to partially oﬀset
this negative productivity shock. With free reallocation of operators, it is optimal to equalize
the services of each machine variety at, say, x. This requires δx operators on the broken
machine and (n−1)x operators on the rest. The total number of operators is unchanged, so
δx+( n − 1)x = nh.
The change in log output is hence
∆lnY =l nn − ln(n − 1+δ),
which is negative, that is, output still drops but it drops by less than without VCU. The
ﬁrm can successfully mitigate some of the impact of the shock with VCU.
The instantaneous variance in this case is
Var(dlnY )/dt = [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)]
2γn.
The ﬁrst part decreases with n. The more machine varieties there are, the more possibilities
there exist to reshuﬄe operators without aﬀecting output too much. The second part is
increasing in n because more complex technologies fail more often. In general the eﬀect
of technological complexity on volatility is hence ambiguous. Nonetheless, as complexity
increases without bound (n →∞ ), the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and volatility goes to zero,
lim
n→∞
Var(dlnY )/dt =0 .
To see this, use the intermediate value theorem to rewrite [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)] as (δ −
1)/[n + ξn(δ − 1)], where ξn ∈ [0,1]. Since ξn is bounded, [lnn − ln(n − 1+δ)]2 = O(n−2)
and γn = O(n).
In summary, the ability to vary capacity utilization can make more complex technologies
less volatile even in the case of fully complementary inputs.
C Data Appendix
Variable Deﬁnitions
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country in 1997, measured in 1995 international
dollars. [WDI, PWT]
Population Population of the country in 1997. [WDI]
Yield volatility Variance of the log of annual wheat yield. [FAOSTAT]
35Rainfall volatility Variance of cumulated log changes in precipitation. Precipitation data
are recorded monthly at several meteorological stations within a country. Because
many stations do not report data in all months, we take the average of year-on-year
changes for all months and all stations within the country. We cumulate these changes
to obtain the country’s deviation from long-run precipitation trends. [Global Historical
Climatology Network]
Temperature volatility Variance of cumulated changes in temperature, calculated in the
same way as rainfall volatility. [Global Historical Climatology Network]
Change in oil price Two-year change in the U.S. CPI-deﬂated price of West Texas Inter-
mediate oil.
Diverse powerplants dummy Takes the value of one if the concentration of powerplants
by type (conventional, hydroelectric, nuclear, renewable) in the country is below the
median. [International Energy Annual]
Technological Diversiﬁcation The log of the inverse of the Herﬁndahl index of concen-
tration of equipment purchases across diﬀerent varieties of capital goods. A sector has
a high Technological Diversiﬁcation index if it purchased many diﬀerent capital goods.
[1997 Capital Flow Tables]
Average Share in Manufacturing The sector’s share in manufacturing employment, av-
eraged across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Labor Productivity Value added per worker in 1995 dollars, averaged across the sample
period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Variance of Productivity The variance of 5-year growth of value added per worker in
1995 dollars across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Skill Intensity The fraction of production workers in the 3-digit ISIC sector that are em-
ployed in skilled or semi-skilled occupations. [Occupational Employment Statistics]
Share of Materials The share of intermediate inputs in total sales. [NBER-CES Manu-
facturing Industry Database]
Equipment per Worker, Structure per Worker [NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database]
Revealed Comparative Advantage The share of sector s in country i’s manufacturing
export relative to the world average. [Trade and Production Database]
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37Table 1. Yield Volatility and Development             
   Variance of wheat yield    






      




      
Temperature volatility         – 0.2413 
(0.1480) 
       Rainfall volatility 
      
0.0319 
(0.1159) 
Observations 20   20   20   
Adjusted R–squared  0.3524    0.329    0.377    
           
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, 1%. All 
variables are in logs. Dependent variable is the variance of log wheat yield per acre. (Source: 
FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.) Temperature volatility is the 
variance of annual temperature changes. Rainfall volatility is the variance of percentage annual 
rainfall changes. (Source: Global Historical Climatology Network.) 
  




Share of oil in 
energy 




Change in oil price ×          









Observations 4169  4164 
Country Fixed Effects  217  217 
Adjusted R–squared  0.089  0.017 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 
5, 1%. Dependent variables are (1) the log change in electricity production in 
kWh, (2) the %point change in the share of oil consumption in total energy 
consumption (in British thermal units). Oil price change is the 2– year change in 
U.S. CPI– deflated price of West Texas Intermediate oil. The concentration of 
power plants is measured as the Herfindahl index of shares of power generation 
techniques (conventional, nuclear, hydroelectric, renewable) in total electricity 
production of the country. Countries with “diverse power plant types” are those 
with below-median concentration. (Source: International Energy Annual 2002, 
Energy Information Administration.) 

























Albania  2789 3339  No    Gambia,  The  1489 1186 No    Niger  729 9770  No 
Algeria  4798  29000 No    Georgia  2130  5431  No    Nigeria  830  118000 No 
Angola  1853 12000  No    Germany  22636 82100 Yes    Norway  27782  4404  Yes 
Antigua and Barbuda  9624  66  No    Ghana 1767  18000  No    Pakistan  1802  128000  Yes 
Argentina  12342  35700 Yes    Greece  14382  10500  No    Panama  5478  2719 Yes 
Armenia  2124  3786  Yes    Grenada  5823  96  No    Papua New Guinea  2379  4761  No 
Australia 22967  18500  Yes    Guatemala 3549  10500  Yes    Paraguay  4625  5085  No 
Austria  23471  8072 Yes    Guinea  1862  6922  No    Peru  4667  24400 Yes 
Azerbaijan 2103  7838  No   
Guinea– 
Bissau 926  1126  No    Philippines  3872  71300  Yes 
Bahamas 15190  289  No    Guyana  3969  749  No    Poland  7703  38700  Yes 
Bahrain 14561  620  No    Haiti  1420  7492  No    Portugal  15103  9945  Yes 
Bangladesh  1388  124000  No    Honduras  2471  5939 Yes    Romania  6512 22600  Yes 
Barbados  13590  265  No    Hong Kong  23734  6502  Yes    Russian Federation  7184  147000  No 
Belarus  6073 10100  No    Hungary  10244 10200 Yes    Rwanda  798  7895  No 
Belgium  24151  10200 No    Iceland  25557  272  No    Samoa  4213  167 No 
Belize  4810  217  No    India  2034  962000 Yes    Saudi  Arabia  11033 19200  No 
Benin 897  5794  No    Indonesia  3217  200000 Yes    Senegal  1341  8777  No 
Bhutan  1239  737 No    Iran  5416  60900  Yes    Sierra  Leone  511  4726 No 
Bolivia 2309  7767  Yes    Ireland  21287  3670 Yes    Singapore  20560  3794  Yes 
Botswana  6552 1533  No    Israel  18382 5836 No    Slovak  Republic 9902 5383  No 
Brazil  7065  164000 No    Italy  21499  57500  Yes    Slovenia  14586  1986 No 
Brunei  17086 313  No    Jamaica  3563  2554  No    Solomon  Islands  2279 404  No 
Bulgaria 4860  8312  Yes    Japan  25405  126000 Yes    South  Africa  8978 40700  Yes 
Burkina  Faso  874 10500  No    Jordan  3899  4459 Yes    Spain  16623 39300  Yes 
Burundi 575  6418  No    Kazakhstan  4713  15300  No    Sri  Lanka  3041  18600  Yes 
Cambodia  1345 11200  No    Kenya  1038 28000 Yes    St. Kitts and Nevis  10937  41  No 
Cameroon 1535  13900  Yes    Korea,  Rep. 15295 46000 Yes    St.  Lucia  5358  150  No 
Canada 24557  30000  Yes    Kuwait  15748  1809  Yes   St.  Vincent  4779  112  No 
Cape Verde  4091  404  No    Kyrgyzstan   2403  4681  No    Sudan  1465  29300  No 
Central African Rep.  1077  3529  No    Lao PDR  1384  4919  No    Suriname  3669  412  No 
Chad  839  7086 No    Latvia  5793  2469  Yes    Swaziland  4038  960 No 
Chile  8740  14600 Yes    Lebanon  4276  4146  No    Sweden  21231  8849 Yes 
China 3152  1230000  Yes    Lesotho  1865  1945  No    Switzerland  25973  7088  No 
Colombia  5891 40000  Yes    Lithuania  6530  3706  No    Syria  3265 15000  No 
Comoros  1618  518 No    Luxembourg 36355  422  No    Tajikistan  941  6017 No  


























Congo, Dem. Rep.  791  46800  No    Macao, China  18970  418  No    Tanzania  484  31300  No 
Congo,  Rep.  997 2767  No    Macedonia  4433 1997 No    Thailand  6591  59400  Yes 
Costa  Rica  6993 3577  Yes    Madagascar  784  14100 No    Togo  1526 4135  No 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1617 14700  No    Malawi  575  9665 Yes   
Trinidad and 
Tobago 7417  1278  Yes 
Croatia  7140  4447  No    Malaysia  8562 21700 Yes    Tunisia  5481  9215  No 
Cyprus  17560 744  Yes    Maldives  6316 256  No    Turkey  6626  62500  Yes 
Czech  Republic  13265 10300  No    Mali  723 10100  No    Turkmenistan  2620  4779  No 
Denmark 24897  5284  Yes    Malta  14355  383  No    Uganda  1078  20400  No 
Dominican  Republic  4903 7968  No    Mauritania  1601 2415 No    Ukraine  3408  50700  No 
Ecuador 3273  11900  Yes    Mauritius  8425  1148  No   
United Arab 
Emirates 20561  2580  No 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  3141 60400  Yes    Mexico  7839 93900 Yes    United  Kingdom 21006 59000  Yes 
El  Salvador  4135 5911  No    Moldova  2261 4312 No    United  States  30123  272000  Yes 
Equatorial  Guinea  3478  421  No    Mongolia  1619 2331 No    Uruguay  8850 3265  Yes 
Eritrea  821  3773  No    Morocco  3335 27300 Yes    Uzbekistan  2137 23700  No 
Estonia  8087  1427 No    Mozambique  705  16600  No    Vanuatu  2778  179 No 
Ethiopia 629  59800  Yes    Namibia  5778  1648 No    Venezuela  6211  22800  Yes 
Fiji  4716  783  No    Nepal  1221 21400  No    Vietnam  1711 75500  No 
Finland 20979  5140  Yes    Netherlands 22464 15600 Yes    Yemen  773 16100  No 
France 21647  58200  Yes    New  Caledonia  22241  202  No    Zambia  784  9443  No 
French Polynesia  20541  224  No    New Zealand  18256  3761 Yes    Zimbabwe  2810 11900  No 
Gabon  6535  1137  No     Nicaragua  2138  4680  No                












– 0.2952***  – 0.3259***  GDP per capita  
(1995 international dollars, log)  (0.0699) (0.0655) 
 –  0.1353***  Population (log)   (0.0376) 
– 3.6316***  – 1.2573  Constant 
(0.5968) (0.8663) 
Observations 167  167 
Adjusted R–squared  0.10  0.15 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  
Table 5. List of Sectors. Technological Diversification Index and Average Share in 
Manufacturing 
ISIC 




Average Share in 
Manufacturing 
311 Food  products  2.898  0.1581 
313 Beverages  2.975  0.0282 
314 Tobacco  2.666 0.0148 
321 Textiles  1.733  0.1210 
322  Wearing apparel, except footwear  2.303  0.0818 
323 Leather  products  3.278  0.0089 
331  Wood products, except furniture  2.368  0.0345 
332  Furniture, except metal  2.909  0.0223 
341  Paper and products  2.433  0.0242 
342 Printing  and  publishing  2.340  0.0371 
351 Industrial  chemicals  2.835  0.0235 
352 Other  chemicals  2.808  0.0342 
353 Petroleum  refineries  2.726  0.0099 
354  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  2.726  0.0023 
355 Rubber  products  2.217  0.0167 
356 Plastic  products  1.847  0.0251 
361 Pottery,  china,  earthenware  3.006  0.0065 
362  Glass and products  3.006  0.0093 
369  Other non– metallic mineral products  3.006  0.0438 
371 Iron  and  steel  2.618  0.0297 
372 Non–  ferrous  metals  3.111  0.0117 
381  Fabricated metal products  2.849  0.0589 
382  Machinery, except electrical 2.817  0.0662 
383 Machinery,  electric  2.487  0.0637 
384 Transport  equipment  2.722  0.0548 
385  Professional and scientific equipment  2.999  0.0116 
      
Notes: Sectors correspond to the 3-digit manufacturing sectors from Revision 2 of the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC). Technological diversification measures the diversity of 
capital goods a sector purchases in the U.S. Average share is the sector’s share in manufacturing employment 
averaged across countries. (See Data Appendix.) 
   
Table 6. Productivity, Volatility and Development 
   Log 
Productivity 
Log        
Variance 
0.7047*** –  0.3005*** GDP per capita (log) 
(0.0690) (0.1020) 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.73  0.14 
Notes: The regressions use sectoral data at the 3– digit level and include 
sector–specific effects. Mean labor productivity and variance of labor 
productivity growth rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for country clustering. * Significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Table 7. Productivity and Volatility within 
Sectors 
   Log 
Variance 
– 0.2871***  Labor productivity (log) 
(0.1049) 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes 
Observations 1521 
Adjusted R–squared 0.13 
Notes: The regression uses sectoral data at the 3– digit level 
and include sector–specific effects. Mean labor productivity 
and variance of labor productivity growth rates correspond to 
the period 1963– 1998. Robust standard errors are adjusted 
for country clustering. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  
Table 8. Productivity, Volatility and Technological Diversification 




0.0660*** –  0.0999**  Technological Diversification 
(0.0234) (0.0448) 
0.2351*** –  0.3005***  Sectoral Skill Intensity (log) 
(0.0441) (0.0919) 
0.2155*** 0.0289  Share of Materials in 
Production (log)  (0.0634) 0.0939 
0.4613*** 0.0062  Equipment per Worker (log) 
(0.0184) 0.0211 
– 0.0532***  – 0.1727***  Labor Share (Log) 
(0.0151) (0.0240) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1535  1535 
Adjusted R–squared 0.81  0.56 
 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level and include country– 
specific effects. Mean labor productivity and variance of labor productivity growth 
rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Technological diversification measures the 
diversity of capital goods a sector purchases in the U.S. Skill intensity is the share of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers. Material share is the ratio of material costs to total 
shipments. Labor share is the sector’s share in manufacturing employment. (See Data 
Appendix.) Robust standard errors are adjusted for country clustering. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  
Table 9. Sectoral Shares, Technological Diversification, and Development 




0.0083* 0.0089**  Technological Diversification  × 
Real GDP per capita (Log)  (0.0044) (0.0044) 
– 0.1015**  – 0.1075*** 
Technological Diversification  
(0.0404) (0.0408) 
– 0.0248**    Real GDP per capita (Log) 
(0.0115)    
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.05  0.12 
 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. The dependent variable is the share of the 
sector in total manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998. The second column includes 
country– specific effects. Technological diversification measures the diversity of capital goods a sector 
purchases in the U.S. (See Data Appendix.) Robust standard errors clustered by country are shown in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 10. Sectoral Shares, Volatility, and Development 
   Sectoral Share  Sectoral Share 
– 0.0006***  – 0.0015***  Sectoral Variance ×  
Real GDP per capita (Log)  (0.0002) (0.0004) 
– 0.0075  – 0.0018  Sectoral Variance  
(0.0061) (0.0060) 
– 0.0064***    Real GDP per capita (Log) 
(0.0014)    
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.04  0.10 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. The dependent variable is the 
share of the sector in total manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998. The 
second column includes country– specific effects. Variance of labor productivity growth 
rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Robust standard errors clustered by country 
are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  
  
Table 11. Relative Size and Volatility 
   Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
– 0.1554*** – 0.1743*** – 0.1893***  Labor Share 
(0.0256) (0.0233)  (0.0293) 
Country Fixed Effects  No Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  No No  Yes 
Observations 1521  1521  1521 
Adjusted R–squared 0.03  0.55  0.59 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. Labor share is the sector’s share in total 
manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for country 
clustering. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 12. Comparative Advantage and Volatility 
   Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
– 0.0893*** – 0.0721*** – 0.0557***  Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(log)  (0.0215) (0.0149)  (0.0148) 
Country Fixed Effects  No Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  No No  Yes 
Observations 1621  1621  1621 
Adjusted R–squared 0.01  0.43  0.47 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. Revealed comparative advantage (Balassa 
1965) is the country’s export share in the given sector relative to the world average export share. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for country clustering. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
  
Table 13. Other Institutions Reducing Volatility 
   Log Variance 




















Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1607 1607 1319 1319 
Adjusted R–squared  0.11  0.12 0.16 0.17 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering within countries. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Complex sectors are those with above median 
investment good diversification. Labor market rigidities are measured by an index that combines the 
costs of firing workers and changing employment terms (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Schleifer and 
Lopez–de–Silanes, 2004). 
 
Table 14. Output versus Input Diversification   
   Log Variance      
(all sectors) 
Log Variance   
(complex sectors) 
–0.1140*** –0.1357***  Number of firms (log) 
(0.0382) (0.0487) 
–0.1550*** –0.1887***  Average size of firms (log) 
(0.0516) (0.0603) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1586  932 
Adjusted R–squared 0.48  0.43 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering within countries. * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Complex sectors are those with 
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